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The Economic Case for Rewards Over Imprisonment 
BRIAN GALLE* 
There seems to be a growing social consensus that the United States imprisons far 
too many people for far too long. But reform efforts have slowed in the face of a 
challenging question: How can we reduce reliance on prisons while still 
discouraging crime, particularly violent crime? Through the 1970s, social scientists 
believed the answer was an array of what I will call preventive benefits: drug and 
mental health treatment, housing, and even unconditional cash payments. But early 
evaluations of these programs failed to find much evidence that they were successful, 
confirming a then-developing economic theory that predicted the programs would 
fail. 
This Article calls for a return to prevention. It first surveys evidence showing that 
a large fraction of prison spending has no incremental effect on crime reduction. 
And it offers the first detailed summary of the modern evidence on prevention. 
Preventive benefits have now been proven effective in a variety of settings. Along the 
way, I argue that a famous federal study of cash benefits was fundamentally 
misinterpreted as failure by its own authors. 
Next, I lay out the theoretical economic case for preventive benefits. Standard 
theory rejects benefits because they are said to cost too much and to potentially 
encourage some individuals to engage in risky behavior in order to be paid to stop. 
I suggest both these arguments rely on evidentiary claims that have now been found 
to be largely false. 
In addition, I collect and synthesize a series of theoretical reasons why benefits 
would outperform imprisonment. Among others, benefits enrich crime-stricken 
communities instead of further impoverishing them, as prison does. This simple fact 
has several important theoretical dimensions. I also show the ways in which the 
potential to deliver rewards ex ante, or before a crime has been committed, help to 
overcome a basic failing of prison: they do not require that humans be highly 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American penal system is badly broken, and everyone knows it. Our prison 
population exceeds the population of some industrialized nations.1 A growing body 
of evidence finds that imprisonment incurs huge social costs, many borne 
disproportionately by communities of color, while producing surprisingly minimal 
reductions in crime.2 The situation is so bad that a movement of scholars and activists 
have called for “abolition,” for abandoning the project of imprisonment.3 While few 
legislators would go so far, states are actively experimenting with and hunting for 
alternatives.4 Democrats and Republicans in Congress have actually recently enacted 
modest reforms, and many on both sides of the aisle in that body continue to weigh 
more serious efforts.5  
 
 
 1. See JEREMY TRAVIS, BRUCE WESTERN & STEVE REDBURN, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 2 (2014). 
 2. Id. at 2, 5; Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration and Social Inequality, 
DÆDULUS, Summer 2010, at 9–12. 
 3. PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 229–31 (2017); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (2019); 
Developments in the Law—Prison Abolition, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1569–73 (2019). 
 4. John F. Pfaff, The Complicated Economics of Prison Reform, 114 MICH. L. REV. 951, 
952 (2016); Tina Rosenberg, On One Issue, Americans Are United. Too Many Are Behind 
Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/opinion/on-one-issue 
-americans-are-united-too-many-are-behind-bars.html [https://perma.cc/M7AD-3HRE]. 
 5. German Lopez, The First Step Act, Explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:42 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/12/18/18140973/state-of-the-union-trump-first 
-step-act-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/T643-5M8F]. 
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Abolition is by design a radical project,6 but even radical change requires 
intermediate steps.7 For those who don’t share abolition’s end goal but do desire 
major reductions in the U.S. prison population, what are the dramatic reforms 
lawmakers could enact that would make a meaningful dent in the American problem 
of crime and punishment? If we end prisons, what of crime?  
Criminologists had a ready answer going into the 1970s.8 At that time, the United 
States and other places around the world were experimenting with a variety of 
policies to prevent crime instead of punishing it.9 Some of these policies were aimed 
at individuals, such as through early child intervention, financial support for families, 
substance abuse treatment, and small-group counseling.10 Others focused on 
neighborhoods, aiming to create a sense of social cohesion and a law-abiding culture 
through community groups as well as investments in infrastructure.11 Yet others 
examined the crime-preventing impact of broad social safety-net programs.12 
But the tide turned swiftly. Early efforts to evaluate these experiments 
encountered challenging statistical methods problems that social science disciplines 
weren’t yet ready to solve.13 And, of course, the politics of punishment changed 
rapidly, especially in the United States, as crime grew dramatically.14 Within a 
decade, crime prevention was utterly out of favor, and “tough on crime” was in.15 
The scholar William Stuntz and his intellectual heirs convincingly argued that “tough 
on crime” policies are often predictable results of U.S. political arrangements.16 
It’s time to reconsider prevention. The fledgling political movement toward 
reduced incarceration offers some hope that prevention programs can find consistent 
financial support. And decades of continuing research and innovation in social 
science methods offers a growing body of evidence that these programs are highly 
 
 
 6. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND PRISON, TORTURE, AND 
EMPIRE 96 (2005); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
1613, 1616–20 (2019). 
 7. Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 
1207–17 (2015). 
 8. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 19 
(1995); Francis T. Cullen & Paula Smith, Treatment and Rehabilitation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 156, 163–65 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011). 
 9. Brandon C. Welsh, Crime Prevention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 126, 127 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011). 
 10. See id. at 130. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13.  COMM. ON RSCH. ON LAW ENF’T AND CRIM. JUST., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE 
REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 14, 27–34 (Lee 
Sechrest, Susan O. White & Elizabeth D. Brown eds., 1979). 
 14. TONRY, supra note 8, at 19–20. 
 15. MICHAEL ROCQUE, DESISTANCE FROM CRIME: NEW ADVANCES IN THEORY AND 
RESEARCH 112–13 (2016); Welsh, supra note 9, at 128. 
 16. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 289 (2011); see 
RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 110–11 (2019); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 53 (2017); Avlana K. Eisenberg, 
Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71, 101–19 (2016). 
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effective, and indeed may be far more effective than incarceration at preventing 
crime.17  
Yet not all the opposition to crime prevention programs has been based on politics 
or uncertain evidence. Economic theory has been staunchly opposed to positive 
incentives or “rewards” as tools for crime prevention.18 Not every aspect of every 
prevention program is a reward—some include projects, like neighborhood watches, 
that would best be described as a more focused and more visible threat of punishment 
for wrongdoers. But most prevention efforts are devoted primarily to offering things 
of value to those who would otherwise commit crimes.  
Probably the most straightforward example was the fledgling effort in Richmond, 
California, where the city paid high-risk young men bonuses, and offered other 
rewards such as expense-paid trips, for having a clean criminal record.19 A similar 
program came close to passage in Washington, D.C.20 In short, the idea is to offer 
things of value to individuals who might be likely to commit crime, but perhaps to 
condition those things on avoiding serious wrongdoing. In many cases the proposed 
benefits are not necessarily cash, but instead in-kind transfers, such as drug treatment 
programs or free tuition, of the sort that reformers believe would tend to further 
diminish the propensity to commit some crimes.  
The relationship between crime and rewards also is an important but so far under-
examined feature of the burgeoning literature on universal basic income. Popular 
authors, politicians, and scholars suggest providing flat payments to everyone in a 
society—or almost everyone.21 Some proposals would eliminate or limit payments 
to individuals currently in prison, or those who otherwise have been convicted of 
certain offenses.22 In many important respects, a new universal basic income (UBI) 
 
 
 17. TRAVIS, WESTERN & REDBURN , supra note 1, at 9; Cullen & Smith, supra note 8, at 
166. 
 18. See infra Parts V, VI. My definition of “reward” is positive, not normative. In other 
words, throughout this article, I will treat a “reward” as any improvement from the currently 
expected baseline, whether or not we think the existing baseline is desirable. In this way, my 
analysis serves as a guide for how to depart from current policy, rather than what ideal policy 
would look like. For more discussion of this definition and a defense of the positive approach, 
see Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price 
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 803–05 (2012).  
 19. Byron Pitts & Meagan Redman, This Once Dangerous California City Gives Young 
Men Money, All-Expense-Paid Trips in Exchange for Not Shooting, ABC NEWS (Sep. 25, 
2016, 4:34 PM) https://abcnews.go.com/US/dangerous-california-city-young-men-money 
-expense-paid/story?id=38190781 [https://perma.cc/S2YJ-4VXW]. 
 20. Karen Workman, D.C. Crime Bill Would Pay People to Avoid Crimes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/us/dc-crime-bill-would-pay-people-to 
-avoid-crime.html [https://perma.cc/JCN8-YU5C]. 
 21. See, e.g., ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME 
WOULD END POVERTY, REVOLUTIONIZE WORK, AND REMAKE THE WORLD 1–11 (2018); 
ANDREW YANG, THE WAR ON NORMAL PEOPLE: THE TRUTH ABOUT AMERICA’S DISAPPEARING 
JOBS AND WHY UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IS IN OUR FUTURE 165–75 (2018); PHILIPPE VAN 
PARIJS & YANNICK VANDERBORGHT, BASIC INCOME: A RADICAL PROPOSAL FOR A FREE 
ECONOMY AND A SANE ECONOMY 4–28 (2017). 
 22. E.g., Philippe van Parijs, Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-
First Century, 32 POL. & SOC’Y 7, 11 (2004) (stating it is “obvious” that prisoners should not 
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program that denies benefits to those convicted of a crime is not much different than 
the Richmond program. But none of the UBI proponents has given any serious 
consideration to this potentially very important feature of UBI design.  
As it happens, the United States already has a UBI that is denied to individuals 
who commit felonies: the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (APFD). The APFD is 
an annual payment from the state of Alaska to every Alaska resident, representing a 
proportional share of the state’s revenues from the sale of oil-extraction permits.23 
But since 1989, individuals who are incarcerated for a felony during a given calendar 
year receive no dividend payout.24 No commentator has examined the economic or 
other policy logic of this rule.25  
Opposition to rewards follows a basic economic logic that has been popular 
among theorists, both of crime and regulatory theory more generally. Economic 
theorists of crime, to the extent that they consider rewards at all, tend to reject them 
out of hand for two basic reasons. For one, the theorists say, rewards are far less cost-
effective than prison.26 Rewards must be paid to everyone who stays straight, while 
we need imprison only the (relatively) few who commit crime.27 For another, rewards 
could actually increase crime.28 If we limit rewards only to individuals in “high risk” 
groups, the presence of the reward could lead some people to want to become “high 
risk.” 
This Article argues that these two theoretical objections are vastly overstated. 
Recent research has shown that imprisonment is a remarkably cost-ineffective tool 
for preventing crime.29 Sentences of many years produce little more deterrence than 
 
 
receive a universal basic income (UBI), but that they should be eligible after release); Miranda 
Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income, 2017 
WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1224–25 (suggesting that a conditional UBI would likely reduce crime).  
 23. Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and Membership in 
the State’s Political Community, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 79, 82–83 (2012). 
 24. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(d) (2019). 
 25. The only public justification for the exclusion was that it is intended to offset the costs 
of victim compensation and prison. State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 159 (Alaska 1991). A 
recent working paper examines empirically the impact the dividend has on propensity to 
commit crimes. Richard Dorsett, Basic Income as a Policy Lever: A Case Study of Crime in 
Alaska (Westminster Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 2019/002, 2019). 
 26. Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 
43, 64 (1996); Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 57, 65 (1984). 
 27. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the 
Multiplication Effect, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365, 369–71 (2010).  
 28. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42 (1960); 
Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 54; see also Anu Bradford & Omri Ben-Shahar, Efficient 
Enforcement in International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 375, 385 (2012) (making this point about 
transfers to deter hostile state action); Zachary D. Kaufman, Protectors of Predators or Prey: 
Bystanders and Upstanders amid Sexual Crimes, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1399 (2019) (noting 
this as a potential downside of rewards for reporting crimes); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global 
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 726 
(1999) (making this point about environmental regulation).  
 29. See Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the 
Literature, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 37–38 (2017); Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence: A Review 
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a sentence of just a few, and yet we routinely imprison individuals for decades.30 
Imprisonment does reduce crime by “incapacitating” young men, keeping them off 
the streets, but this benefit largely disappears as men age and their propensity to 
commit crimes drops precipitously.31 Through some rough calculations, I claim that 
these facts, combined with some sensible design features that could be implemented 
with most reward programs, make rewards highly competitive with imprisonment on 
a crime-reduction-per-dollar basis. Likewise, the notion that rewards would increase 
crime ignores a vast literature on the economics of insurance.32 Insurers face similar 
problems, and their many modern solutions offer a variety of policy templates for 
lawmakers interested in rewards.  
Even aside from these counterarguments, the economic study of crime has failed 
to recognize that economic theory in fact supplies a set of very compelling arguments 
in favor of rewards over imprisonment. In some cases other authors have made note 
of one or another of these individual arguments. But so far as I know, there is no 
prior comprehensive effort to bring together all the competing claims for and against 
rewards as a way of preventing crime.33 That failure has profound consequences, for 
once we see all the arguments together in one place, it becomes clear that the 
intellectual case for rewards is overwhelming.  
For example, theorists of crime have largely neglected the importance of two 
fundamental features of rewards that, according to economists, strongly favor 
rewards in other contexts.34 By definition, rewards make their recipients richer, while 
imprisonment causes suffering that does not create gain for anyone else. Canonical 
accounts of the economics of punishment rely on these facts to argue that fines, not 
imprisonment, are the best way to regulate human behavior.35 We resort to prison 
only because most people cannot pay. The same logic implies that rewards are also 
superior to prison, and superior to fines too. Rewards are not limited by the ability of 
the defendant to pay. And rewards make the defendant richer, when we know that 
households with higher lifetime income are less likely to commit crime.  
So, too, criminal theorists have long known that imprisonment is a poor fit for 
human psychology.36 Most humans are bad at planning for tomorrow, but a system 
of deterrence depends entirely on the notion that the threat of long-distant future pain 
of the Evidence by a Criminologist for Economists, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 83, 85–88, 100 (2013). 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 42–53.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 306–13.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 266–90.
33. The only close antecedent is a brief discussion section in an unpublished paper, in
which the author mentions but does not analyze several factors that he believes might be 
relevant. Murat C. Mungan, Positive Sanctions Versus Imprisonment, 23–25 (George Mason 
Univ. Law & Econ. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 19-03, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3317552 [https://perma.cc/BK3Q-TD33]. The paper also offers a 
formal model of the importance of transferability in the case for rewards, and I discuss that 
issue in some depth in Part II, infra.  
34. See infra Parts II, III.
35. See infra notes 124–27.
36. See Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE
LAW & ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 272–81 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. 
Smith eds., 2005); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A 
Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 173, 175–97 (2004). 
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will keep us on the straight and narrow today. Rewards can be designed to flip this 
dynamic. Reward systems can be engineered to offer small, certain, and current 
incentives to individuals to commit themselves to crime-avoidance programs. That 
is, the reward is magnified because it is offered today, while the possible future cost 
of being bound by our commitments is diminished because it will be paid tomorrow.  
Admittedly, it is likely that employing rewards by themselves may fall short of 
the ideal policy. In many of the separate points I examine, economic theory suggests 
that the best result might instead be a combination of rewards with imprisonment or 
other punishments, but with the punishments being far smaller in magnitude than we 
see currently in the United States. Thus, I can be taken to offer not a blueprint for 
prison abolition, but instead a path that leads in that direction.  
I also don’t mean to suggest that I have any special insights into the political 
obstacles that a systematic program of crime-preventing rewards might face. But to 
the extent that political opposition derives ultimately from intellectual opposition by 
serious scholars, I offer reason to believe that existing opposition rests on grounds 
that are, at best, not fully considered.  
As a last introductory note, I should mention that my primary method here is 
utilitarian. Many legal theorists instead approach crime and punishment from a 
“retributivist” framework, in which an important question is how to match the moral 
weight of a punishment to the offender’s moral wrong.37 Since in large measure my 
goal is to identify how to prevent crime from occurring at all, I can mostly sidestep 
the issue of the morality of punishing. But I should also note that I agree with the 
claim that retributivism is fundamentally misguided to the extent that it attempts to 
assign moral blame solely to wrongdoers.38 Social science now makes a compelling 
case that it is society’s choices that put many individuals in the position where they 
must choose between injuring others and their own suffering (or the suffering of their 
family).39 A just criminal justice system should recognize, as Michael Seidman 
suggests, that preventing crime is a burden for all of society to share.40  
Part I of this Article begins by examining the available empirical evidence on the 
efficacy of prevailing tools for crime prevention and offers the reader some examples 
to keep in mind of what an effective rewards program might look like. Parts II 
through IV then examine three key economic arguments that predict rewards would 
 
 
 37. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, 
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 181–82 (Ferdinand Schoeman 
ed., 1987). Some approaches combine both perspectives. For instance, a few influential 
commentators have suggested that retributivist theory can supply an upper limit on just 
punishments, while utilitarian theories can influence what sentence should be chosen within 
those limits. Michael Tonry, Punishment, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 95, 103–07 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (tracing this argument to H. L. A. Hart); TRAVIS, 
WESTERN & REDBURN, supra note 1, at 87. 
 38. See, e.g., EDGARDO ROTMAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT: A NEW VIEW OF THE 
REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 118–19 (1990); TONRY, supra note 8, at 4–5, 158–
59. 
 39. TONRY, supra note 8, at 4–5, 158–59. 
 40. Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the 
Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 342–45 (1984).  
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be far more effective. Parts V and VI consider and reject traditional claims against 
rewards. 
I. REWARDS IN CONTEXT 
Although there are many potential ways of conceptualizing crime prevention,41 
my focus here is on the subset of practices that typically involve providing people 
with things they value. In some cases, but not necessarily all, these transfers are 
conditioned on the recipient refraining from crime, or are targeted to individuals or 
populations who are thought to be especially at risk of engaging in criminalized 
behaviors. As we’ll see over the next few Sections, it’s typically this combination of 
features—enriching the recipient, and conditioning the benefit on abstaining from 
risky behaviors they would otherwise be prone to—that form the main grounds for 
debate about reward mechanisms. Meanwhile, it may be helpful for the reader to 
have a sense of the range of real-world examples of these policies.  
I also want to show at the outset the real stakes involved. The design of a criminal 
justice system should be based in evidence. Many reward-type programs now have 
solid social science findings of their effectiveness. Indeed, the evidence for the 
effectiveness of rewards is now far more convincing than the evidence that prison 
deters crime. That fact forms the necessary foundation for all my subsequent 
analysis. 
 A. Preventative Benefits: Overview and Evidence 
To begin, there is little evidence that prison actually deters.42 A number of older 
papers, many from the 1980s, claim to find deterrent effects of imprisonment, but 
these studies are unreliable. One set of papers looks at simple correlations between 
crime rates and sentence lengths. That correlation, if any, tells us little because the 
causation can flow in either direction; voters panicked about high crime may 
authorize higher sentences, for instance.43 Several other studies find extremely low 
 
 
 41. E.g., McLeod, supra note 7, at 1218–32. 
 42. Probably the most convincing direct evidence is David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The 
Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence, in 38 ADVANCES IN 
ECONOMETRICS 73, 76, 89–90 (2017) (finding that a doubling of the prospective sentence 
would reduce offending by no more than about 10%). For surveys, see Chalfin & McCrary, 
supra note 29, at 26, 37–38; Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and 
Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
173, 181–82 (2008); Nagin, supra note 29, at 85–88; see also Steven N. Zane, Brandon C. 
Welsh & Daniel P. Mears, Juvenile Transfer and the Specific Deterrence Hypothesis, 15 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 901, 902–24 (2016) (conducting meta-analysis of studies 
examining impact of changes in date individual can be charged as adult, and concluding that 
on average there were no significant effects of criminal liability on crime). 
 43. See Nagin, supra note 29, at 86 (dismissing the correlational studies on this basis); cf. 
Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, at 25 (noting that first “credible” study with this design 
emerged in 1994, but stating that it was “useful” but not “compelling”). 
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“elasticities,” or rates of response, between length of sentence and commission of 
crimes.44 
One recent paper does convincingly find deterrent effects for repeat offenders 
(i.e., that prison reduces recidivism).45 That paper reports that tougher sentencing 
guidelines reduce recidivism for shoplifters, but the experience of being sentenced 
by a tougher sentencing judge does not.46 This suggests that the observed reduction 
in recidivism is not because the defendant is still in jail, but instead is because they 
perceive a greater cost of re-offending. Guidelines have no impact on drunk driving, 
however.47 
By far the largest estimates of prison’s deterrence capacity come from studies of 
a dramatic policy shift in Italy, when the Italian government announced in 2006 it 
would release nearly two-fifths of prisoners to relieve prison overcrowding.48 Many 
released individuals would have had to serve the entire remaining balance if they 
reoffended. Individuals with longer suspended sentences recidivated less, implying 
that the threat of a longer sentence deterred more.49 It is not clear how readily these 
results translate to ordinary sentencing. They focus only on recidivism. The pardon 
received massive publicity, and the threat of the future sentence was uniquely well-
known and certain for each offender, whereas the typical potential offender has very 
little direct knowledge of likely sentences.50 Offenders with longer suspended 
sentences may also have believed that they faced an elevated chance of detection—
that is, believed the police would be more motivated to catch them. 
To the extent that prison deters at all, evidence suggests that short but certain 
sentences are far more effective than long sentences.51 Even in the best-case 
 
 
 44. Eric Helland & Alex Tabarrok, Does Three Strikes Deter? A Nonparametric 
Estimation, 42 J. HUM. RES. 309, 310–29 (2007); Randi Hjalmarsson, Crime and Expected 
Punishment: Changes in Perceptions at the Age of Criminal Majority, 11 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 209, 239–44 (2009); Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: 
The Case of Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 
251, 252–53 (Jens Ludwig & Philip Cook eds., 2003). 
 45. Sarah M. Estelle & David C. Phillips, Smart Sentencing Guidelines: The Effect of 
Marginal Policy Changes on Recidivism, 164 J. PUB. ECON. 270 (2018). 
 46. Id. at 281–84, 288–89. 
 47. Id. at 289. In another related result, Mehdi Barati, Punishment Severity and Crime: 
The Case of Arkansas, 15 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (2018), reports that a change in Arkansas law 
to reduce some thefts from “Class D Felony” to misdemeanor corresponded with a six percent 
increase in theft arrests. As with many such studies, it is difficult to rule out omitted variables, 
such as changes in enforcement decisions by police officers, as confounding factors. Taking 
this result at face value, though, implies a very small elasticity. A Class D felony carries a six-
year maximum sentence, while misdemeanors carry sentences of no more than one year. ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-4-401 (2010). The implied elasticity is -6%/500% = -.012. 
 48. Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati & Pietro Vertova, The Deterrent Effects of Prison: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 117 J. POL. ECON. 257, 258 (2009). 
 49. Id.; Giovanni Mastrobuoni & David A. Rivers, Criminal Discount Factors and 
Deterrence 17–21 (May 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://publish.uwo.ca/~drivers2 
/research/Criminal_Discount_Factors_5_19_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/366X-B96V]. 
 50. Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, at 10–12; Hjalmarsson, supra note 44, at 245. 
 51. TRAVIS, WESTERN & REDBURN, supra note 1, at 5; Thomas A. Loughran, Ray 
Paternoster, Aaron Chalfin & Theodore Wilson, Can Rational Choice Be Considered a 
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scenarios for the threat of prison providing deterrent effects, the marginal impact of 
added prison time diminishes rapidly—that is, the longer the sentence, the smaller 
the impact of added time.52 Individuals highly discount distant-future costs, so that 
after about five years, the marginal deterrent effect of additional imprisonment is 
close to zero.53  
Drug treatment programs are probably the most obvious and highest-return 
prevention tactic.54 A huge share of individuals in prison—more than half of some 
offender categories—are there at least in part because they committed their crime to 
obtain drug money or because they were under the influence of drugs or alcohol.55 
Research finds that drug treatment programs can be highly effective in preventing 
criminal behavior.56 Not all programs are effective, of course, but a common thread 
for those that work is that they work to identify the highest-risk individuals, assess 
those individuals’ needs—drug dependency, low employability, unrestrained 
impulsivity—and match treatment to need.57 Mental health is also highly associated 
with criminal activity, and similar efforts at treating behavioral disorders likely have 
substantial returns as a result.58  
 
 
General Theory of Crime? Evidence from Individual-Level Panel Data, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 86, 
89, 101–02 (2016); Nagin, supra note 29, at 87, 100. 
 52. Mastrobuoni & Rivers, supra note 49, at 19–20.  
As I noted earlier, Estelle and Phillips, supra note 42, find a deterrent effect from changes in 
Michigan sentencing guidelines, but the sentencing ranges for the relatively minor offenses 
they study are predominantly under two years. Id. at 275–76. 
 53. Mastrobuoni & Rivers, supra note 49, at 42 Fig. 5. I should acknowledge that, if the 
Mastrobuoni and Rivers result is driven by offender expectations about enforcement efforts 
(i.e., those with longer suspended sentences think they are more likely to be caught re-
offending), that could offer a rival explanation. Police motivations might increase for longer 
sentences, but this effect might be diminishing with very long sentences.  
 54. BUTLER, supra note 3, at 234; Jonathan P. Caulkins & Mark A.R. Kleiman, Drugs and 
Crime, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 275, 306 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2011); Ojmarrh Mitchell, Drug and Other Specialty Courts, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 843, 844 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).  
 55. Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Minimizing the Maximum: The Case for Shortening All Prison 
Sentences, in SMART DECARCERATION: ACHIEVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSFORMATION IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 137, 150 (Matthew Epperson & Carrie Pettus-Davis eds., 2017); see also 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 2000 ARRESTEE DRUG ABUSE MONITORING: ANNUAL REPORT 
(Apr. 2003) (reporting that 63% of arrestees in Miami, Florida, tested positive for a controlled 
substance); David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the 
Pickpocket’s Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 303 tbl. 1 (2002) (reporting that two-thirds 
of surveyed offenders reported that “recent drug use” contributed to commission of crime); 
see also Benjamin Hansen & Glen R. Waddell, Legal Access to Alcohol and Criminality, 57 
J. HEALTH ECON. 277, 278–88 (2018) (finding large jump in assaults after individual passes 
legal drinking age). 
 56. Cullen & Smith, supra note 8, at 169–70; Mitchell, supra note 54, at 844. 
 57. Mitchell, supra note 54, at 844. 
 58. See Yvonne Jewkes, Prisons, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
872, 887 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (noting that one-third of those incarcerated have a 
diagnosed mental disorder). For surveys of the efficacy of mental-health diversion programs, 
see Virginia Aldigé Hiday & Padraic J. Burns, Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System, 
in HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF MENTAL HEALTH 478, 493–95 (Teresa L. Scheid & Tony N. 
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Vocational and educational programs have also been shown to reduce recidivism, 
both in the United States and around the world.59 Typically, these are programs made 
available to incarcerated individuals who are nearing their release date,60 but there is 
little about the concept that would limit enrollment strictly to those who have already 
offended. Over time, research has helped to refine the design of training programs, 
identifying and motivating the elimination of ineffective approaches.61 Modern 
programs attempt to identify enrollees who would benefit the most from the 
(typically scarce) available seats by using algorithmic assessments of those who are 
most at risk of re-offending.62  
Housing benefits are especially promising and deserve more attention in the 
criminal justice literature.63 The best-known evidence comes from studies of the 
“Moving to Opportunity” demonstration project run by the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development.64 Treated households received vouchers to move 
to new neighborhoods. Violent crime fell; property crimes increased in the short run, 
but not overall. Recent studies involving quasi-random assignment of refugees in 
Denmark,65 and from the demolition of U.S. housing projects, reach similar results.66 
This suggests location may have an important impact on crime, at least for some 
offenses. Violent crime, for instance, has been found to often be motivated by a desire 
for social status among the offender’s peers.67 Relocation, by changing the peer 
environment, might remove this motivation.68 In contrast, property crimes might be 
 
 
Brown eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 59. Aaron Chalfin & Steven Raphael, Work and Crime, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 444, 457–58 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011); Alicia Sasser Modestino, How 
Do Summer Youth Programs Improve Criminal Justice Outcomes, and for Whom?, 38 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 600, 601–27 (2019); Faye S. Taxman & Amy Murphy, Community 
Interventions for Justice-Involved Individuals, in SMART DECARCERATION: ACHIEVING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSFORMATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 192, 193–94 (Matthew W. 
Epperson & Carrie Pettus-Davis eds., 2017); Manudeep Bhuller, Gordon B. Dahl, Katrine V. 
Løken & Magne Mogstad, Incarceration, Recidivism, and Employment, 128 J. POL. ECON. 
1269 (2020). 
 60. Taxman & Murphy, supra note 59, at 200.  
 61. Id. at 206. 
 62. Id. at 194–95. 
 63. One already thorough treatment, including the observation that vouchers are not 
useful if landlords are free to discriminate against voucher holders, is BUTLER, supra note 3, 
at 143–47. 
 64. See Mirko Draca & Stephen Machin, Crime and Economic Incentives, 7 ANN. REV. 
ECON. 389, 398 (2015) (summarizing studies on the Moving to Opportunity demonstration 
project). 
 65. Anna Piil Damm & Christian Dustmann, Does Growing Up in a High-Crime Area 
Affect Youth Criminal Behavior?, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1806, 1807–31 (2014). 
 66. Dionissi Aliprantis & Daniel Hartley, Blowing It Up and Knocking It Down: The 
Local and City-Wide Effects of Demolishing High Concentration Public Housing on Crime, 
88 J. URB. ECON. 67, 68–80 (2015). 
 67. Loughran, Paternoster, Chalfin & Wilson, supra note 51, at 101; Fagan & Meares, 
supra note 42, at 186–87. Peer groups may also affect risk perception, which can weaken the 
deterrent effects of the criminal justice system. Robinson & Darley, supra note 36, at 180. 
 68. Cf. DAVID J. HARDING, LIVING THE DRAMA: COMMUNITY, CONFLICT, AND CULTURE 
AMONG INNER-CITY BOYS 68–131 (2010) (describing role of neighborhood peers in teen 
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crimes of opportunity, and of course opportunities for profitable theft are usually 
greater when the individual is moved to richer neighborhoods. 
If many crimes are committed to secure social status, then the criminal justice 
system has so far mostly overlooked an important potential source of rewards.69 
Governments can compete with private sources of status by offering reputational 
rewards for good behavior.70 Reputation mechanisms are common in the regulation 
of business enterprises, where customer goodwill translates directly to dollars, but 
some of these techniques could also be applied to individuals.71 For instance, a recent 
experiment in Pakistan found that rich tax avoiders became more compliant when 
they had a chance to appear on a government list of the biggest taxpayers.72 More 
prosaically, the relocation studies show that government can break the relationship 
between violent crime and status by changing a potential offender’s peer group. This 
doesn’t have to be done only geographically; it could also be achieved by helping at-
risk individuals to form new social bonds, such as through community organizations, 
recreational opportunities, or, most powerfully, new schools.73  
This may well be the dynamic at work behind the successful implementations of 
“comprehensive community initiatives.”74 These programs offer a range of social 




 69. An exception is Fagan and Meares, supra note 42, at 182–212, which considers the 
relationship between formal legal sanctions and “informal social controls,” and emphasizes 
the role community plays in crime prevention. Similarly, Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal, and 
Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1196 (2004), 
observe that enhancing the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system can be a cost-
effective method for reducing crime. There is of course a robust literature on the reverse side 
of this coin: the use of shaming as a penalty. E.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming 
White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. 
& ECON. 365, 368–72 (1999).  
 70. For a more complete discussion of the challenges and rewards of reputational 
incentives generally, see Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic 
Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to Confront the Challenge of Motivational 
Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REGUL. 213, 272–73 (2016). 
 71. Ezra Goldschlager, Praise and the Law, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 369–89 (2016). 
 72. Joel Slemrod, Obeid Ur Rehman & Mazhar Waseem, Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary 
Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from Pakistan, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 25623, 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25623; see also Paul E. 
Carillo, Edgar Castro & Carlos Scartascini, Do Rewards Work? Evidence from the 
Randomization of Public Works (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. IDB-WP-794, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103797 [https://perma.cc/QX5E 
-E96Y] (finding a short-term improvement in tax compliance from public recognition of 
randomly selected compliers). 
 73. Cf. Jeffrey Fagan, Cessation of Family Violence: Deterrence and Dissuasion, in 11 
FAM. VIOLENCE 377, 403, 408 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989) (arguing that 
cessation from crime requires changes in social networks, physical locales, or both). Studies 
find powerful peer effects from classmates. E.g., Jinho Kim & Jason M. Fletcher, The 
Influence of Classmates on Adolescent Criminal Activities in the United States, 39 DEVIANT 
BEHAV. 275, 275–91 (2018) (showing five percent increase in classmate offending correlated 
with three percent increase in own offending). 
 74. Welsh, supra note 9, at 127. 
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developing a sense of communal solidarity.75 These may be combined with other 
vaguely punitive interventions that also promote a sense of community, such as 
neighborhood watches or patrols.76 A version of the community initiative known as 
“communities that care” (CTC) combined these features with a public-health type 
scientific approach, identifying and targeting factors that were predictors of crime.77 
A randomized controlled trial found that CTC reduced crime community-wide.78 
More generally, social attachments reduce crime, and so programs with this social 
focus often produce measurable benefits.79 
Other community-level efforts have also been found to significantly prevent 
crime. Successes include several programs aimed at parents, including outreach and 
training on effective parenting, especially parenting children who exhibit antisocial 
behavior.80 Cleanup programs, such as remediating blighted lots, enforcing housing 
codes, and installing streetlights, reduce crime both in the affected areas and in 
neighboring locations.81 Mentoring and high-quality after-school programs work 
too.82 And perhaps the largest success story in this category is early childhood 
education, where a well-known and long-running study has followed the lives of 
children who were randomized into a carefully designed pre-K program.83  
What about direct cash payments? In a famous set of 1976 experiments, the U.S. 
Department of Labor (DOL) set out to test the impact of paying released inmates in 
Georgia and Texas a large fraction of the full-time minimum wage.84 The 
experimenters declared the policy a failure, and further expansions were never 
attempted.85 But the researchers misunderstood their own experiment. As they 
 
 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 128. 
 78. J. David Hawkins, Eric C. Brown, Sabrina Oesterle, Michael W. Arthur, Robert D. 
Abbott, & Richard F. Catalano, Early Effects of Communities That Care on Targeted Risks 
and Initiation of Delinquent Behavior and Substance Use, 43 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 15, 16–
22 (2008). For additional discussion of the “communities that care” initiative, see J. David 
Hawkins, Preventing Crime and Violence Through Communities That Care, 7 EUR. J. CRIM. 
POL’Y & RSCH. 443 (1999). 
 79. ROCQUE, supra note 15, at 154–56. 
 80. Welsh, supra note 9, at 132–36. 
 81. Id. at 140–41. 
 82. Id. at 137–39. 
 83. James J. Heckman, Seong Hyeok Moon, Rodrigo Pinto, Peter A. Savelyev & Adam 
Yavitz, The Rate of Return to the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 114 
(2010); see also Frances A. Campbell, Elizabeth P. Pungello, Margaret Burchinal, Kirsten 
Kainz, Yi Pain, Barbara H. Wasik, Oscar A. Barbarin, Joseph J. Sparling & Craig T. Ramey, 
Adult Outcomes As a Function of an Early Childhood Education Program: An Abdecedarian 
Project Follow-Up, 48 DEV. PSYCH. 1033, 1034–42 (2012) (finding benefits in randomized 
controlled trial of early childhood education program for low-income families); David 
Deming, Early Childhood Interventions and Life-Cycle Skill Development: Evidence from 
Head Start, 1 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 111, 112–33 (2009) (reporting that Head Start 
program reduces subsequent adult crime among enrolled children). 
 84. Richard A. Berk, Kenneth J. Lenihan & Peter H. Rossi, Crime and Poverty: Some 
Experimental Evidence from Ex-Offenders, 45 AM. SOCIO. REV. 766, 767–70 (1980). 
 85. Id. at 777; see also Karen M. Needels, Go Directly to Jail and Do Not Collect? A 
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reported, holding a job reduced recidivism.86 And, controlling for hours worked, 
receiving the DOL’s payments reduced recidivism too.87 The problem, the 
researchers explained, was that receiving the payments also reduced the releasee’s 
likelihood of working, and so the net effect of the program was no impact on 
recidivism.88  
But a remarkable feature of the experiment’s design explains its failure. Every 
dollar the releasees received in wages reduced their payment from the DOL by one 
dollar. There was no control group that received payments without this “tax” 
structure.89 It’s hardly surprising, then, that the DOL’s payments reduced work—the 
payments were subject to a 100% marginal tax rate!90 Not many people would go to 
work, especially in the demanding conditions available to recently incarcerated 
individuals in Georgia and Texas in 1976, when going to work does not yield any net 
pay.  
If anything, then, the experiment’s finding that payments reduce recidivism 
should have been understood as a success story, and evaluations of other policies 
confirm that. For instance, for a brief period in the late 1970s, California allowed 
individuals released from prison to collect unemployment benefits if they had hit 
certain hours-worked targets while incarcerated. This policy reduced recidivism by 
about 13%.91 A small-scale experiment with cash payments in Baltimore also 
reduced thefts by about 27%.92 
Lastly, there is strong evidence that general social safety -net programs often have 
the added benefit of reducing crime. For example, recent work finds that the 
minimum wage,93 supplemental nutrition assistance (the erstwhile “food stamps” 
 
 
Long-Term Study of Recidivism, Employment, and Earnings Patterns Among Prison 
Releasees, 33 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 474 (1996) (conducting follow-up study with 
same group of offenders and describing results of the initial experiment as “disappointing”). 
This negative finding was especially influential because of the prominence of the researchers; 
Rossi, for example, was at that time the President of the American Sociological Association.  
 86. Berk, Lenihan & Rossi, supra note 84, at 781. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 777. 
 89. The experiment included one treatment group with pay subject to only a 25% tax rate, 
but those subjects apparently were not accurately informed about the rate and believed it was 
also 100%. Id. at 769 tbl.1, 775 n.8. 
 90. The marginal rate did drop to zero once participants worked enough weekly hours that 
their wages exceeded the DOL payment. But this would have required twenty to thirty hours 
of unpaid work for most of the participants. Even full-time work would have yielded an 
average tax rate of upwards of 50%.  
 91. Richard A. Berk & David Rauma, Capitalizing on Nonrandom Assignment to 
Treatments: A Regression-Discontinuity Evaluation of a Crime-Control Program, 78 J. AM. 
STAT. ASS’N. 21, 25–26 (1983). 
 92. KENNETH J. LENIHAN, U.S. DEP’T LAB., UNLOCKING THE SECOND GATE: THE ROLE OF 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN REDUCING RECIDIVISM AMONG EX-PRISONERS 7 (1977), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED134704.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LT9-UQUL]. 
 93. Pallab K. Ghosh, Gary A. Hoover, & Zexuan Liu, Do State Minimum Wages Affect 
the Incarceration Rate?, 86 S. ECON. J. 845, 857 (2019); Dorsett, supra note 25, at 5–6 
(reporting that Alaskan dividend payment reduced property crimes, and this effect was 
stronger when the payment was unconditional). 
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program),94 and the earned-income tax credit95 each reduce crime. Alaska’s 
Permanent Dividend Fund payments reduced crime, and this effect was actually 
stronger when criminal offenders were eligible to receive payments. 96 While none 
of these programs are likely to be cost-justified on the basis of their crime-reducing 
power alone, crime reduction should be included in the benefit side of any cost-
benefit analysis of the safety net.  
 B. How Benefits Are Delivered 
Many rewards systems use officials within the existing criminal-justice system as 
intermediaries to help target preventive outlays to the right people. Sometimes the 
officials are prosecutors, as in the “community prosecutor” model piloted in 
Milwaukee.97 Milwaukee’s Community Prosecution Unit is intended to prevent 
crime at the neighborhood level. The Unit gathers information from partner 
community groups and from police officers on the beat.98 It then works to solve 
potential problems before they lead to crimes and arrests.99 It diverts some offenders 
to mental-health treatment.100 It may refer drug users to treatment or send those 
struggling to make ends meet to resources available through nearby community 
organizations or the government.101 
In other instances judges are the intermediaries, as in the so-called “community,” 
“problem-solving,” or other specialty courts.102 Drug courts are a common 
example.103 The standard drug court involves low-level offenders with substance-
abuse problems. Rather than sentencing these defendants to jail, the court instead 
gives them access to substance-abuse counseling and treatment, albeit sometimes at 
the threat of incarceration if they fail to comply with drug-quitting protocols.104 
 
 
 94. Cody Tuttle, Snapping Back: Food Stamp Bans and Recidivism, 11 AM. ECON. J.: 
ECON. POL’Y 301, 302–26 (2019). 
 95. Amanda Y. Agan & Michael D. Makowsky, The Minimum Wage, EITC, and Criminal 
Recidivism 14–15, 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25116, 2019), https: 
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3097203 [https://perma.cc/97K6-GCPC]. 
 96. Dorsett, supra note 25. I explore the likely explanation for this surprising result in 
Part III, infra. It is worth noting that universal payments funded through an income tax might 
not be as effective as the Dividend Fund because the income tax presumably would be imposed 
only on legal-sourced income, creating a larger wedge between legal and illegal returns. 
Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 22, at 1224–25. To my knowledge, there is no empirical 
evidence on the effect of tax rates (other than the EITC) on crime or recidivism.  
 97. John Chisholm & Jeffery Attenburg, The Prosecutor’s Role in Promoting 
Decarceration, in SMART DECARCERATION: ACHIEVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSFORMATION 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 71, 79 (Matthew W. Epperson & Carrie Pettus-Davis eds., 2017). 
 98. Id. at 78. 
 99. Id. at 76, 78. 
 100. Id. at 76–77, 83. 
 101. Id. at 79, 81. 
 102. Kathryn Bocanegra, Community and Decarceration: Developing Localized Solutions, 
in SMART DECARCERATION: ACHIEVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSFORMATION IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 115, 124 (Matthew W. Epperson & Carrie Pettus-Davis eds., 2017). 
 103. Mitchell, supra note 54, at 844. 
 104. Id. at 846, 853. 
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Several high-quality evaluations have found drug and community courts to reduce 
recidivism and improve treatment outcomes, but other forms of specialty courts have  
not yet proven their efficacy.105  
As Allegra McLeod observes, not all instantiations of these courts are genuine 
alternatives to punishment, and many in fact can exert more control over defendants 
than a standard court.106 In her preferred model, the problem-solving court fully 
diverts individuals from the criminal-justice system, instead connecting them with 
treatment, job and housing placement, and other essential services.107 Courts and 
other policy makers monitor and experiment with the system continually to improve 
its performance.108 Drug diversion and other treatment options can be made a part of 
sentencing guidelines, as several states have done, potentially reducing concerns 
about arbitrariness or discrimination in who is granted access.109  
Lastly, police departments, too, can and do serve as prevention intermediaries. In 
the most common “community policing” approaches, police departments work either 
to vigorously enforce minor but visible offenses (the “broken windows” approach), 
to identify problems that are likely to lead to demands for policing before they fester, 
or some combination thereof.110 The programs I focus on—those that omit broken 
windows enforcement—operate at some “distance” from the criminal justice system, 
in the sense that they work to avoid situations where an individual would be actually 
subject to arrest. Others, though, incorporate diversion even post-arrest, giving 
officers the option of “street diversion,” sending accused offenders to alternative 
treatment programs rather than to court.111 As with problem-solving courts, some 
advocates argue that using police as intermediaries is inherently problematic, posing 
the danger that mingling social services and law enforcement will tend to criminalize 
poverty.112 Empirical evidence so far shows only modest returns to these forms of 
policing on average.113 
 
 
 105. Bocanegra, supra note 102, at 124; Brian D. Johnson, Sentencing, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 696, 719–20 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).  
 106. Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting 
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1612–44 (2012); see also ISSA KOHLER-HAUSER, 
MISDEMEANORLAND 3–10 (2018) (describing how New York City’s misdemeanor courts 
acquire “managerial” power over offenders); Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 
53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 597 (2016) (raising concerns that drug-court model “expand[s] the 
scope of state control over the lives of those entangled in the [criminal] justice system”). 
 107. McLeod, supra note 106, at 1595–96. 
 108. Id. at 1650; see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and 
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 841–52 (2000). 
 109. Johnson, supra note 105, at 719. 
 110. Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, at 18–20; Michael D. Reisig, Community and 
Problem-Oriented Policing, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 538, 
538–40 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011). 
 111. Mary D. Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 167 
(2013); see Barbara Fedders, Opioid Policing, 94 IND. L.J. 389, 429–33 (2019). 
 112. Cf. Roberts, supra note 3, at 16–18, 27 (describing “entangled” state of “[p]ublic 
welfare programs” and law enforcement, and arguing that “order-maintenance” policing gives 
officers “wide discretion to control black people’s presence on public streets”).  
 113. See Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, at 19–20; Reisig, supra note 110, at 566. 
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To be sure, such efforts are likely to be only one component of a larger strategy 
for transforming the criminal justice system. At their current scale and budget, 
intermediated diversion programs and their like may replace only a fraction of the 
role prison now plays.114 We now know that local economic conditions, including 
the strength of social safety-net programs and even minimum wage laws, impact 
recidivism.115 It’s likely they have similar impacts on initial entries into criminality.  
Thus, broad-based spending programs aimed at these problems can likely also be 
evaluated through my framework. As we’ll see, even the most unconditional of 
programs, such as a universal basic income, share certain key structural features with 
a more targeted initiative such as street diversion. But there are also important 
differences. In the Conclusion, I discuss the trade-offs my analysis suggests for these 
alternative paths to decarceration. For now, let’s consider the theoretical case against 
prison. 
II. REWARDS REDUCE DEADWEIGHT LOSS 
A crucial reason to favor rewards over prison is that rewards avoid the massive 
deadweight loss incarceration causes. “Deadweight loss” is an economist’s term for 
costs that society incurs that produce nothing in return.116 It’s the technical equivalent 
of lighting money on fire.  
Unlike rewards, prison wastes resources in two different ways. For one, as experts 
have long recognized, prison fails to transfer the defendant’s pain.117 That is, the 
suffering of a defendant in prison doesn’t improve anyone else’s life. Of course, 
prison deters, and that is useful, but one could impose an equal amount of suffering 
through a “transfer” instrument, such as a fine, and then use the fine revenues for 
useful government projects, victim restitution, or the like. In addition, prison reduces 
social well-being by injuring innocent third parties without producing anything 
useful in return. I’ll now unpack both these points.  
A. Transfers 
It’s hard to understate how important the difference between transfer and 
transferless instruments can be. Suppose you have two policy options. Both cost $10 
billion to enact. One provides $10 billion in benefits, the other $16 billion. Which 
would you implement?  
Swapping from transferless to transfer instruments can produce swings this big 
and bigger. Imagine that we want to deter people from dumping mercury into rivers 
 
 
 114. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 97, 100, 106 (2015). 
 115. See Chalfin & Raphael, supra note 59, at 458 (showing higher offending rates for 
those suffering from unemployment and lower potential wages). 
 116. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 51–52 (3d. ed. 2011). 
 117. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of 
Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 411–12 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell eds., 2007); Murat C. Mungan, Positive Sanctions Versus Imprisonment, 4–5 (Geo. 
Mason L. Econ. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 19-03, 2019), ssrn.com/abstract=3317552 
[https://perma.cc/C2G5-28WB]. 
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and streams. We estimate that with a new mercury restriction at the optimal level of 
deterrence, we could avoid $10 billion worth of damage to human health and the 
environment from reduced mercury dumping.118 Reducing mercury is not costless, 
however. For one, those who comply with the new regulation must undertake costly 
efforts to avoid spills.119 Let’s call this figure $4 billion. And then let’s say that for 
some mercury polluters, the costs of avoiding spills are less than the expected cost 
of being caught. These emitters will suffer the penalty rather than pay to avoid it. 
Call this amount $6 billion.120  
Should we enact the new mercury limitation regime? If our penalty is purely 
transferless (say, polluters are forced to consume mutant fish that grow in 
contaminated rivers),121 probably not. We must count the suffering of defendants in 
our social calculus—they’re people too.122 If the system costs anything at all to 
 
 
 118. The “optimal” deterrence is the level of dissuasion at which the marginal social costs 
of compliance are exactly equal to the marginal social benefits from additional deterrence. 
GRUBER, supra note 116, at 139. In other words, we don’t want people to spend more to 
comply than society would gain from their compliance. Id. at 122–23. Nor do we want people 
to stop complying when there are additional cost-effective compliance steps still available. 
This brief description omits many important details (for instance, does it matter who pays and 
who would suffer if the pollution weren’t abated?) that aren’t pertinent for our discussion. Of 
course, calculating the optimal point is contentious and often uncertain, but its details are not 
relevant to my discussion here. For a helpful survey of the literature, see generally Gloria E. 
Helfand, Peter Berck & Tim Maull, The Theory of Pollution Policy, in HANDBOOK OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 249 (Karl-Goran Maler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003). 
 119. This is the reason we likely do not want to reduce mercury emissions to zero. The cost 
of preventing each additional unit of mercury is probably greater than the last—the marginal 
cost curve slopes upwards. At some point, to prevent every last drop of mercury, we’d have to 
forego all fossil fuels and live as Stone Age hunter-gatherers who hadn’t yet discovered coal. 
Again, regulatory theory thus suggests instead that we limit mercury reduction to its “optimal” 
amount, or the point at which added expenses wouldn’t produce benefits that were at least as 
big. GRUBER, supra note 116, at 139. 
 120. Punishment is likely to be more socially costly than compliance expenditures, at least 
if calculated per unit of pollution. Those for whom it is cheaper to comply than be punished 
do so, and therefore compliers necessarily spend less per unit of compliance than the penalty 
they would suffer.  
 121. See The Simpsons: Two Cars in Every Garage and Three Eyes on Every Fish (Fox 
television broadcast Nov. 1, 1990). 
 122. In the past, commentators would sometimes argue that criminal defendants’ utility 
should be omitted from social welfare calculations. E.g., J.L. Lewin & W.N. Trumbull, The 
Social Value of Crime?, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 271, 275–78 (1990); George J. Stigler, The 
Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970). It’s never been clear why. 
The standard line was that criminals’ preferences are “immoral” and should be excluded on 
this basis. Lewin & Trumbull, supra note 122, at 275–78. That position made no sense in 
economic analysis, since a key justification for the normative appeal of welfare maximization 
in an economic framework is exactly that it avoids making judgments about the worth of 
anyone’s preferences. Allowing regulators to refuse to include some people’s preferences 
gives license to the policy maker to shortchange unpopular views. And it presents 
unmanageable line-drawing questions, many of which would predictably be resolved in favor 
of those with greater political power. Can we ignore the preferences of individuals who steal 
but not those who conspire to monopolize a market?  
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administer, our regime is a net loser. It produces $10 billion in benefits and costs 
regulated parties $10 billion total. So it yields $0 in net benefits and likely costs  
additional money to administer.123  
Alternatively, what if the mercury emitter pays a fine instead? Then there are still 
$10 billion in costs for the regulated parties. But our benefits have changed. We have 
$10 billion worth of mercury reduction and also $6 billion worth of revenue from 
fines with which we can now do as we please. We therefore have a project that 
produces a $6 billion surplus (less administrative costs), a likely huge winner.  
For this reason, economists of crime have been steady advocates for replacing 
prison with fines and restitution, but they recognize that fines have an inherent 
limitation.124 You can only fine someone as much as they can afford to pay (or 
borrow or acquire insurance for).125 In the past I’ve called this the “liquidity 
problem.”126 Often, this amount is far less than the optimal sanction amount. Thus, 
most deterrence regimes ultimately resort to prison as a way of overcoming the 
liquidity constraint and fully deterring offenders.127 
Using rewards instead of either fines or imprisonment offers the best of both 
worlds.128 The reward is a transfer instrument: it costs taxpayers money, but it also 
makes the recipient better off, so that the net cost is far smaller than a prison sentence 
would likely offer.129 And the reward amount has no natural limit. In fact, rewards 
are arguably even less constrained than prison. We can only imprison someone for 
one lifetime, but there’s no cap to the amount of cash we can offer them. Admittedly, 
though, after a certain point additional cash probably loses its incentive value.  
The difference between rewards and prison isn’t quite as stark as the simple 
examples I just gave, however, because it turns out that it matters who is paying and 
who is receiving transfers. That is, transferring $6 billion to mercury polluters may 
not be the best use of $6 billion. If society could have made more productive use of 
that money, we likely should count the difference between the two as a loss.130 Even 
if the government has no additional spending programs that would produce value, it 
could still have cut taxes by $6 billion. This is actually a pretty good use of cash, 
since taxes are socially costly—they change people’s behavior, creating another kind 
of deadweight loss.131 So by giving the money to the polluters, we must have higher 
 
 
 123. For simplicity, I assume the regulator has only two choices: enact the $10 billion 
mercury restriction or not. Often, the regulator could instead enact a less stringent policy with, 
say, only $9 billion in benefits. If this policy carries only $8.5 billion in costs, it is more 
attractive than either the $10 billion policy or doing nothing. But I ruled out this possibility 
when I stipulated that the $10 billion policy was the optimal, i.e., the best available. 
 124. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 117, at 411–12, 19; Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 63. 
 125. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies 
Among Individuals, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 618, 618–19 (1991).  
 126. Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1738–42 
(2015). 
 127. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 117, at 421; Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 63.  
 128. For a formal model, see Mungan, supra note 117, at 7–11. 
 129. Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 837, 848–49 (2014). 
 130. Id. at 849–50. 
 131. GRUBER, supra note 116, at 590–93. 
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taxes, and this is costly to the extent that the $6 billion in tax revenue produced 
deadweight losses. This net burden is often called the “marginal cost of public funds” 
—that is, the waste that comes along with raising another dollar for the fisc.132  
Another difference between the real world and my example is that prison also 
involves some transfers. Although inmates’ suffering is nontransferable, there are 
people who build prisons and guards who patrol them.133 And the funds to pay the 
builders and guards must be paid for with taxes, again incurring a deadweight loss in 
an amount depending on the marginal cost of public funds.  
With a simple thought experiment, we can ignore the role of the marginal cost of 
public funds. Suppose that we were to take half our prison budget, whatever it is, and 
use it for rewards instead. Taxes remain the same, so it doesn’t matter how costly 
they are to impose and collect. 
In this framework, the choice between rewards and prison becomes in part a 
question of whether we prefer money to be in the hands of potential offenders or 
prison operators. Economics generally refuses to prioritize the well-being of some 
people over others.134 But it recognizes that, because of the diminishing marginal 
utility of wealth, we may prefer to transfer money to people who have less of it.135 If 
Richie has $1,000, he might buy nicer champagne to serve on his yacht. If Po has 
$1,000, she will spend it on life-saving drugs. In other words, Po receives greater 
utility from each incremental dollar she spends than Richie does.136 Rewards might 
be preferable to prison, then, to the extent that they tend to transfer money to poorer 
households on average.  
Either way, rewards will certainly have a welfare advantage over prison to the 
extent of any suffering experienced by those in prison. To see this, consider a very 





 On our balance sheet, $X is the suffering (in dollar terms, or any other measure 
of utility we might decide to employ) of the incarcerated. Numbers in parentheses 
are negative numbers. Assuming a dollar is equally useful in the hands of guards and 
defendants, it is clear that prison is worse off by the amount $X.  
 
 
 132. Agnar Sandmo, Redistribution and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds, 70 J. PUB. 
ECON. 365, 366 (1998). 
 133. Sonja B. Starr, On the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Justice Policy: A 
Response to the Imprisoner’s Dilemma, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97, 106 (2013). 
 134. See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
1193, 1197 (1985). 
 135. GRUBER, supra note 116, at 609. 
 136. Of course, while diminishing marginal utility is the typical response to added 
resources, individuals may differ in the extent to which their utility diminishes. Economic 
models work with estimates of population-level averages.  
 Reward Prison 
Cost ($1b) ($1b) 
Guards $0 $1b 
Defendants $1b ($X) 
Potential victims $2b $2b 
Net $2b $2b - $X 
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Of course, this isn’t the whole story. I’ve assumed in my thought experiment that 
prison and rewards are equally cost-effective: that is, that we would obtain equal 
amounts of crime prevention (on the balance sheet, this is the value delivered to 
potential victims) for our $1 billion investment. That needn’t be the case. If prison 
were far more cost-effective, the difference between the two could be quite narrow, 
or even favor prison. Or the opposite might be true, as the evidence I reviewed in 
Part I could suggest. I’ll return to some factors that contribute to relative efficacy in 
Part VI.  
 B. Negative Externalities 
Imprisonment is also wasteful to the extent that it damages third parties without 
any incremental deterrent effect. Prison punches holes in society. Inmates cannot 
care for their spouses or children, cannot volunteer for their local church, cannot 
serve on juries or (usually) vote.137 Individuals in prison contribute little 
economically to their home community, stripping high-crime areas of demand for 
legitimate goods and services and sapping their sources of able labor.138 Replacing 
existing workers who are sentenced to prison can be costly for employers.139 Often, 
government services must strive to fill these holes, leading to higher taxes or fewer 
services elsewhere.140 High-crime areas also usually see a large number of recently 
released individuals returning to the neighborhood, often with poor job prospects and 
serious health needs, and these place added burdens on the economic and social 
fabric of the community.141 
Recent data suggest the magnitude of some of these effects. For example, multiple 
studies find that the incarceration of the mother of a young child has a devastating 
impact on the educational attainment, income, and even health of her child.142 In a 
large sample of low-income households, families with a recently incarcerated father  
 
 
 137. BARKOW, supra note 16, at 46–49; Matthew W. Epperson & Carrie Pettus-Davis, 
Smart Decarceration: Guiding Concepts for an Era of Criminal Justice Transformation, in 
SMART DECARCERATION: ACHIEVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSFORMATION IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 3, 7 (Matthew W. Epperson & Carrie Pettus-Davis eds., 2017). 
 138. Demetra Smith Nightingale & Harold Watts, Adding It Up: The Economic Impact of 
Incarceration on Individuals, Families, and Communities, in THE UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF INCARCERATION 91, 96–97 (Vera Inst. of Just. ed., 1996); Kevin M. 
Drakulich, Robert D. Crutchfield, Ross L. Matsueda & Kristin Rose, Instability, Informal 
Control, and Criminogenic Situations: Community Effects of Returning Prisoners, 57 CRIME, 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 493, 498–99 (2012) (summarizing other studies); Dorothy E. Roberts, The 
Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1271, 1293–94 (2004). 
 139. See Steven Raphael, The Effects of Conviction and Incarceration on Future 
Employment Outcomes, in LABELING THEORY: EMPIRICAL TESTS 237, 239–40 (David P. 
Farrington & Joseph Murray eds., 2014) (modeling costs to employer of replacing incarcerated 
workers). 
 140. PFAFF, supra note 16, at 119. 
 141. Drakulich, Crutchfield, Matsueda & Rose, supra note 138, at 495–96, 513–14; Todd 
R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 37 CRIME & JUST. 97, 103, 
107–08, 115 (2008); Roberts, supra note138, at 1294. 
 142. TRAVIS, WESTERN & REDBURN, supra note 1, at 6; Western & Pettit, supra note 2, at 
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were twice as likely to receive SNAP and Medicaid.143  
Rewards, on the contrary, might provide spillover benefits or “positive 
externalities” over and above their crime-preventing benefits. A growing body of 
evidence on unconditional cash payments finds an array of benefits, and thus far little 
sign of significant downsides.144 Most obviously, an individual who shares a 
household or other close relationship with children, parents, or a non-working partner 
can also share their reward, benefitting all of them.145 Cash-payment recipients in 
some settings also seem to have higher educational attainment, possibly because the 
payments free them to spend more time in school and less making rent. 146 
Educational attainment benefits not just the recipient but also future employers and 
dependents.147  
A classic worry about government payouts, whether cash or otherwise, is that they 
will discourage recipients from working.148 Several studies of unconditional cash 
transfers have now searched for and found no evidence of substantial negative impact 




 143. Naomi F. Sugie, Punishment and Welfare: Paternal Incarceration and Families’ 
Receipt of Public Assistance, 90 SOC. FORCES 1403, 1404–26 (2012). 
 144. E.g., Johannes Haushofer & Jeremy Shapiro, The Short-Term Impact of 
Unconditional Cash Transfers to the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya, 131 Q.J. 
Econ. 1973, 2025 (2016). Some of these results are subject to meta-analysis in Frank Pega, 
Sze Yan Liu, Stefan Walter, Roman Pabayo, Ruhi Saith & Stefan K. Lhachimi, Unconditional 
Cash Transfers for Reducing Poverty and Vulnerabilities: Effect on Use of Health Services 
and Health Outcomes in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, COCHRANE DATABASE OF 
SYSTEMATIC REV., 2017, at 3, https://www.cochranelibrary.com/cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858 
.CD011135.pub2/epdf/full [https://perma.cc/2XFN-EJFD]. For a helpful overview of the 
findings in the U.S. context, see Ioana Marinescu, No Strings Attached: The Behavioral Effects 
of Unconditional Cash Transfer Programs 5–10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 
No. 24337, 2018).  
 145. Marinescu, supra note 144, at 9. 
 146. Id.; see Sarah Baird, Francisco H.G. Ferreira, Berk Özler, & Michael Woolcock, 
Conditional, Unconditional and Everything in Between: A Systematic Review of the Effects of 
Cash Transfer Programmes on Schooling Outcomes, 6 J. DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS 1, 2–
42 (2014) (surveying other studies). 
 147. See Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev & Yavitz,, supra note 83, at 119–22. 
 148. VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 21, at 133. 
 149. Randall K.Q. Akee, William E. Copeland, Gordon Keeler, Adrian Angold & E. Jane 
Costello, Parents’ Incomes and Children’s Outcomes: A Quasi-Experiment Using Transfer 
Payments from Casino Profits, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 86, 87–114 (2010); Derek Hum 
& Wayne Simpson, Economic Response to a Guaranteed Annual Income: Experience from 
Canada and the United States, 11 J. LABOR ECON. 263, 264–95 (1993); Andrew Bibler, 
Mouhcine Guettabi & Matthew Reimer, Universal Cash Transfers and Labor Market 
Outcomes 3 (Feb. 25, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3357230 [https://perma.cc/USU4-9QT7]); Damon Jones & 
Ioana Marinescu, The Labor Market Impacts of Permanent Cash Transfers: Evidence from 
the Alaska Permanent Fund 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24312, 2020); 
see also Marinescu, supra note 144, at 7–8. The largest estimate comes from Robert M. 
Feinberg & Daniel Kuehn, Guaranteed Nonlabor Income and Labor Supply: The Effect of the 
Alaska Dividend Fund, B.E. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY, 2018, DOI: 
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higher tax rates discourage work among most parts of the population.150  
The exceptions are working mothers.151 Econometric studies generally agree that 
social welfare programs can reduce the labor supply of low-income moms.152 Other 
researchers find that higher tax rates can discourage women whose husbands earn 
large salaries from entering the workforce.153 Both of these results suggest that 
women place a very high value on being home with their children—or that finding 
replacement childcare is very costly—so that relatively small changes in the returns 
 
 
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2018-0042 [https://perma.cc/JL5C-EDFY], who find 
elasticities of about -.1 (that is, labor supply falls by .1% for every 1% increase in guaranteed 
income).  
A small reduction is, as noted in Hilary W. Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein, Universal Basic 
Income in the U.S. and Advanced Countries 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 
No. 25538, 2019), consistent with strong evidence in other contexts that work supply falls 
modestly when incomes rise. See also Jones & Marinescu, supra note 149, at 1–2 (noting this 
finding in studies of lottery winners but questioning whether it would apply to broad-based 
programs that also affect labor demand). Effects are most notable for those at the margins of 
the work force. For instance, there is evidence that access to large cash transfers speed 
retirement for older workers. E.g., Werner Hernani-Limarino & Gary Mena, Intended and 
Unintended Effects of Unconditional Cash Transfers: The Case of Bolivia’s Renta Dignidad 
68–69 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. IDB-WP-631, 2015), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146439 [https://perma.cc/6KRN-H54H]. In addition, some papers 
report that transfers delay entry into the paid workforce, especially for young men, but these 
men likely use the resulting time to acquire more education, so that net effects on labor output 
are ambiguous. Laura Juárez González & Tobias Pfutze, The Effects of a Non-Contributory 
Pension Program on Labor Force Participation: The Case of 70 y Más in Mexico 19 (Banco 
de México, Working Paper No. 2014-12, 2014). 
 150. Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod, & Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income 
with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 4 (2012) 
(“[E]vidence of a substantial compensated labor supply elasticity has been hard to find . . . .”). 
Recent work underlines earlier findings that responses are concentrated in those at the edges 
of the labor pool—school-age workers, potential retirees, and working mothers. Jósef 
Sigurdsson, Labor Supply Responses and Adjustment Frictions: A Tax-Free Year in Iceland 
4–5 (Sept. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278308 [https://perma.cc/7VLP-VZXD]). Reported earnings are 
also more responsive among the self-employed. Isabel Z. Martinez, Emmanuel Saez & 
Michael Siegenthaler, Intertemporal Labor Supply Solution? Evidence from the Swiss Income 
Tax Holidays 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24634, 2018). 
 151. See Bibler, Guettabi & Reimer, supra note 149, at 3 (noting that women’s labor supply 
decreased slightly in response to dividend payments while men’s increased). But see Martinez, 
Saez & Siegenthaler, supra note 150, at 22–24 (finding larger responses for Swiss men).  
 152. Hilary Williamson Hoynes & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Work Incentives and 
the Food Stamp Program, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 151, 152–61 (2012); Thomas Lemieux & Kevin 
Milligan, Incentive Effects of Social Assistance: A Regression Discontinuity Approach, 142 J. 
ECONOMETRICS 807, 808–27 (2008); see Hoynes & Rothstein, supra note 149, at 18–19 
(reviewing studies, but suggesting that some of labor impact may be due to stigma, not 
payments). But see Robert Moffit, Welfare Programs and Labor Supply, in 4 HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 2393, 32–41 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) (reporting 
that studies to that date did not clearly establish any negative effect of welfare programs on 
labor supply).  
 153. See Saez, Slemrod & Giertz, supra note 150, at 3–4. 
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to work are effective in discouraging their labor efforts.  
If  anything,  these studies’ estimates  of the labor-supply effects of transfers for  
women speak to the likely magnitude of the costs that come with prison and the 
benefits of rewards. Based on the strength of their revealed preferences for being at 
home, imprisoning mothers evidently causes a large degree of suffering for the 
mother, a large dollar cost to hire replacement care for her dependents, or both.154 
Rewards on the other hand might allow some caregivers who otherwise could not 
afford childcare to enter the workforce, go to school, or both.155 
To be clear, negative spillovers on third parties are not necessarily pure waste. In 
a technical economic sense, if a potential offender knows that his imprisonment will 
hurt his family, and this knowledge discourages him from committing a crime, then 
the harms to family are not wasted because they contribute to deterrence, a socially 
desirable outcome. Obviously, that rationale would be very difficult to accept for 
retributivists or mixed efficiency-retributive theorists: justice usually prohibits 
intentional injury to innocent people in order to avenge harms to other innocents.156  
Hurting innocent third parties is also bad economics. For one, it is likely that 
defendants will not fully internalize the suffering of third parties. Parents do care 
deeply for their children, and spouses for their partners, but not necessarily one 
hundred percent as much as they care for themselves. Certainly we should not expect 
defendants to fully “internalize” the third-party harms to neighbors, employers, and 
the local economy. Any injuries that defendants do not feel themselves, and so do 
not contribute to deterrence, would remain deadweight loss.  
Secondly, accounting for third-party harms in sentencing can lead to dangerous 
perverse incentives. An economically rational law enforcement authority would 
likely impose lower sentences in the presence of third-party harms that were fully 
internalized by a defendant.157 But knowing this, potential offenders who are aware 
that their own sentence would also damage the community (and are more indifferent 
to that fact than the average defendant) may feel more free to commit crime. 158 
 
 
 154. It is likely the same is true of society’s growing share of care-providing fathers, but 
data so far don’t show that convincingly. 
 155. Rocio Sanchez-Mangas & Virginia Sanchez-Marcos, Balancing family and work: The 
effect of cash benefits for working mothers, 15 LABOUR ECON. 1127, 1138–41 (2008); see 
Ghazala Naz, The impact of cash-benefit reform on parents’ labour force participation, 17 J. 
POPULATION ECON. 369, 370, 380 (2004) (reporting that reduction in net subsidies for child 
care reduced womens’ workforce participation, and summarizing similar earlier findings); cf. 
Anna Aizer, Shari Eli, Joseph Ferrie & Adriana Lleras-Muney, The Long-Run Impact of Cash 
Transfers to Poor Families, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 935, 967–69 (2016). 
 156. Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1397–
98 (2002); Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 983, 1006 (2004); see DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE 
OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 96 (2009) (describing a 
deontological approach to criminal law burdens on families). 
 157. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30 
ECON. INQUIRY 583, 584 (1992). 
 158. For a formal model, see Brian Galle & Murat C. Mungan, Optimal Enforcement with 
Heterogeneous Private Costs of Punishment 4–8 (George Mason Law & Econ., Research 
Paper No. 19-11, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3380273 
[https://perma.cc/QHA3-P26D]. 
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Brandon Garrett dubs this phenomenon the “too big to jail” problem.159 Accounting 
for social ties and other third-party harms can also introduce uncertainty and racial 
and wealth disparities into the justice system.160  
But setting aside the occasional tax-evading billionaire, few potential offenders 
are too big to reward. That is, rewards allow us to sidestep all the gamesmanship and 
complications that accounting for third-party harms introduces into the sentencing 
process. This alone would be a strong factor in their favor. Admittedly, some 
potential offenders, such as megacorporations, might be so wealthy that they are 
difficult to entice with rewards society can afford.161 But often even these entities 
place critical information or key decisions in the hands of individuals, such as mid-
level managers, who are far easier to sway.162 That fact is the keystone of proposals 
to police anti-trust offenses with bounties for firm whistleblowers.163  
III. REWARDS ELIMINATE THE CRIMINOGENIC EFFECTS OF PRISON 
Another major benefit of rewards is that they eliminate and, in some cases, even 
reverse the tendency of prison to create more crime. Some of the “criminogenic” 
impacts of imprisonment are likely familiar even to inexpert readers: prisons are 
dangerous places where some inmates make personal connections or develop “skills” 
that tend to contribute to more crime, both through gang membership and other 
avenues. Just about any incentive that keeps offenders away from prison could 
mitigate these problems. Another major contributor to new crime, though, is what 
economists might call the “income effect” of incarceration. Here, rewards uniquely 
flip the impact of prison, offering greater crime prevention per dollar by not only 
avoiding prison’s unwanted effect but creating a distinctive benefit. We’ll begin 
there.  
A. Income and Substitution Effects 
In the economic analysis of incentive design, government policies typically 
change individuals’ behavior through a combination of “income” and “substitution” 
 
 
 159. BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 1–2 (2014). 
 160. See Brown, supra note 156, at 1401–02 (noting that third-party effects 
disproportionately protect white-collar defendants).  
 161. Cf. Galle, supra note 18, at 819 n.115 (observing that small rewards usually have more 
impact on poorer households). 
 162. This assumes that firms cannot contract to perfectly align the incentives of owners 
with managers, but that is, to say the least, an uncontroversial assumption. See Eugene F. Fama 
& Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 312–15 
(1983). 
 163. E.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 373 n.15 (2013); Cécile 
Aubert, Patrick Rey & William E. Kovacic, The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-Blowing 
Programs on Cartels, 24 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1241, 1252–54 (2006). For some cautionary 
notes, such as the observation that paying bounties may crowd out intrinsic motivations, see 
David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, 
and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605, 622–29 (2014). 
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effects.164 A substitution effect is a difference in relative price: when apples are 
cheaper than oranges, all else equal, we put more apples in the shopping cart.165 
Income effects represent the idea that our preferences change when our budget 
changes: Richie buys products with famous labels, while Po purchases the store 
brand.166  
Imprisonment works through substitution effects.167 A rational actor would 
commit crimes when the benefit of crime exceeds the expected costs. By choosing 
illegal work, an individual likely gives up time spent on legal work. As a result, 
higher legal wages and more work opportunities discourage crime.168 When work 
opportunities are scarce or low value, illegal work is more appealing, and 
imprisonment works to tip the balance back toward staying legit.  
It’s a familiar point in the literature that rewards and penalties generally have 
similar substitution effects.169 It doesn’t matter if oranges are on sale, or if apples are 
marked up; either way, if oranges are relatively cheaper, we’ll likely buy more of 
them. Similarly, a reward can be designed to have the same substitution effects as 
prison. Suppose an offender would pay fifty thousand dollars to avoid her likely 
sentence of imprisonment. Committing an illegal act makes her that much worse off. 
Now suppose instead that the government offers her a fifty-thousand-dollar payment, 
but which she cannot receive if she commits an offense. Either way, offending will 
cause a loss of fifty thousand dollars (less any benefits from committing the offense, 
of course).170  
The income effects of prison work against its substitution effects.171 Essentially, 
incarceration makes the offender poorer, and crime is more appealing the poorer one 
is.172 Economic crimes, in particular, are crimes of desperation.173 There is 
considerable evidence that even violent crimes are correlated with poverty and social 
dislocation, though this may be partly explained by the fact that the category of 
 
 
 164. GRUBER, supra note 116, at 35–37. 
 165. Id. at 36. Of course, this analysis ignores the fact that oranges are juicy and delicious 
while apples are doctor-repelling, worm-harboring, Snow White-bespelling trash.  
 166. This pattern has been shown empirically. E.g., Jean-Pierre Dubé, Günter J. Hitsch & 
Peter E. Rossi, Income and Wealth Effects on Private-Label Demand: Evidence from the Great 
Recession, 37 MARKETING SCI. 22, 23–24 (2018). 
 167. Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, at 7–8; Meares, Katyal & Kahan, supra note 69, 
at 1173–74. 
 168. Meares, Katyal & Kahan, supra note 69, at 1187; see Draca & Machin, supra note 64, 
at 390, 395 (describing substitution effects of higher lawful wages on crime). 
 169. Galle, supra note 18, at 808. 
 170. Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 47. Again, for ease of explanation, the example omits 
important complications that might result from diminishing marginal utility of wealth or from 
other forms of loss aversion. Galle, supra note 18, at 816–19.  
 171. Cf. Galle, supra note 18, at 817 (arguing that carrots are preferable for inferior goods). 
For general analysis of contending income and substitution effects, see THOMAS STERNER, 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 167 
(2002). 
 172. Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 53; see PFAFF, supra note 16, at 120 (noting evidence that 
prison reduces lifetime wealth). 
 173. CORMAC Ó GRÁDA, FAMINE: A SHORT HISTORY 52–56 (2009). 
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“violent” crime includes robbery and burglary.174  
One way to think about this point is that we all have a “target” amount of lifetime 
earnings we want to have available to meet our current needs and be ready for 
retirement. Most offenders lose money while in jail and also suffer a steep drop in 
earning capacity once they exit.175 Part of this drop is due to legal and practical 
obstacles to hiring for individuals with a criminal record,176 but some is due directly 
to imprisonment itself. For instance, being behind bars contributes to “human 
capital” erosion, as we forget what we’ve learned, and our useful knowledge is 
getting out of date.177 Thus, being imprisoned makes it much more likely we’ll fall 
short of our target lifetime earnings—perhaps desperately short. With few other ways 
to reach our target, we commit more crime. Then we are caught, and the cycle repeats 
again.  
Rewards upend this unfortunate story. Like several other potential alternatives to 
incarceration, rewards would avoid the lost wages and depreciated human capital that 
accompany jail time. Even better, cash or other valuable transfers help potential 
offenders to make ends meet, bringing them further from the threshold of desperation 
that would make crime seem like a rational option. In a formal model of optimal 
deterrence, the income effect can be shown to reduce the size of the incentive 
government needs to offer to achieve its optimum.178 Further, in communities most 
impacted by crime, systematic rewards might help to reverse the cycle of poverty, 
crime, and social resignation to the fact of criminality that itself may well contribute 
to crime.179  
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend offers some recent evidence on the 
importance of income effects. As Dorsett finds, the Fund was more effective at 
reducing crime before 1989, when the legislature added an exclusion for individuals 
in prison.180 Seen only from a substitution effect perspective, this is a puzzling result: 
 
 
 174. Allegra M. McLeod, Beyond the Carceral State, 95 TEX. L. REV. 651, 683–84 (2017). 
 175. Western & Pettit, supra note 2, at 13 (finding forty percent drop in average earnings); 
see Draca & Machin, supra note 64, at 395–96 (summarizing evidence of effect of 
incarceration on earnings). The impact is especially dramatic for younger offenders, where 
prison often interrupts high school completion. Anna Aizer & Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Juvenile 
Incarceration, Human Capital, and Future Crime: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 
130 Q.J. ECON. 759, 763 (2015). 
 176. Western & Pettit, supra note 2, at 13–14. 
 177. Charles E. Loeffler, Does Imprisonment Alter the Life Course? Evidence on Crime 
and Employment from a Natural Experiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 137, passim (2013); Anke 
Ramakers, Robert Apel, Paul Nieuwvbeerta, Anja Dirkzwager & Johan Van Wilsem, 
Imprisonment Length and Post-Prison Prospects, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 399, passim (2014); cf. 
Randi Hjalmarsson, Criminal Justice Involvement and High School Completion, 63 J. URB. 
ECON. 613, passim (2008) (finding that longer prison sentences increase school drop-out 
rates). But see Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment and Earnings, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 863, passim (2006) (finding no marginal loss of post-prison earnings for longer 
sentences, in setting where sentence length resembles random assignment). 
 178. See Brian Galle, Carrots, Sticks, and Salience, 67 TAX L. REV. 53, 60–62, 86–89 
(2013), for more discussion and a graphical illustration.  
 179. Fagan & Meares, supra note 42, at 202–12; Western & Pettit, supra note 2, at 18. 
 180. Dorsett, supra note 25, at 31–32. 
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why is there more crime when committing crime reduces Dividend Fund income?181 
Income effects are a possible answer. The enriching impact of the Fund payments is 
present before 1989 but not afterwards, and the large difference in income between 
the two periods turns out to be more important than the substitution effect.  
Rewards can also combine income and substitution effects. If the returns to legal 
employment are higher, crime becomes less appealing through both paths: the 
individual is better off, and she would be giving up more to engage in crime.182 Not 
surprisingly, then, there is now considerable evidence that stronger economic 
conditions reduce crime.183  
Admittedly, there are intermediate reform options that move our current criminal 
justice system in the direction of rewards while retaining a major role for 
imprisonment. For example, states and the federal government could make major 
strides toward removing the many legal barriers to employment for those with 
criminal records.184 Similarly, we could greatly expand mechanisms for sealing 
criminal histories, especially for youthful offenders who stand to lose the most 
lifetime income.185 All these reforms would mitigate, but likely not eliminate, the 
economic costs of incarceration.  
 B. Prison Creates Crime  
Avoiding imprisonment through the use of rewards would also sidestep a common 
and perverse effect of incarceration: it generates more crime. The criminogenic 
potential of prisons has been well canvassed by prior literature,186 so my treatment 
here will be cursory.  
First, prisons give rise to inmate-on-inmate violence.187 The U.S. penal system, in 
particular, places large numbers of individuals in very close proximity, under highly 
resource-constrained circumstances. In some instances, inmates are also subject to 
psychological stresses, such as periods of solitary confinement, that could well be 
 
 
 181. See Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 22, at 1224–25 (arguing that a universal basic 
income that excluded offenders would likely reduce crime).  
 182. Cf. Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, at 32 (explaining that job supports discourage 
crime through substitution effects).  
 183. Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, at 33–37; Draca & Machin, supra note 64, at 393–
95, 399; Mirko Dracan, Theodore Koutmerides & Stephen Machin, The Changing Returns to 
Crime: Do Criminals Respond to Prices?, 86 REV. ECON. STUD. 1228, 1254 (2019); Ming-Jen 
Lin, Does Unemployment Increase Crime? Evidence from U.S. Data 1974–2000, 43 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 413, passim (2008). 
 184. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 611, 684–92 (2014). 
 185. Murat C. Mungan, Reducing Crime Through Expungements, 137 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 398, 402 (2017); see Amy Shlosberg, Evan J. Mandery, Valerie West, & Bennett 
Callaghan, Expungements and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
353, 356–62 (2014) (describing “formidable” barriers to expungement in most states). 
 186. See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 16, at 61–72; Epperson & Pettus-Davis, supra note 
137, at 7–8; Fagan & Meares, supra note 42, at 176. 
 187. PFAFF, supra note 16, at 119–20. 
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described as torture.188 These are the classic ingredients for violent conflict.189 In 
addition, for well-known political economy reasons, U.S. governments have not been 
willing to commit the resources necessary to ensure that inmates are safe from one 
another.190  
Prison inmates also build social networks that tend to lead to more crime.191 Cut 
off from friends and family, and often forced to depend on in-prison networks for 
personal safety and other resources, many incarcerated individuals naturally form 
social bonds with other prisoners. While, again, proof of the causal impact of prison 
is difficult, a number of recent quasi-random “experiments” support the inference 
that an inmate’s assignment to facilities with more individuals who have already 
engaged in burglary, violence, and drug use indeed causes, through peer effects, 
increased burglary, violence, and drug use upon release.192  
At the same time, widespread imprisonment erodes the social and economic 
conditions that help to prevent crime. As we’ve seen, prison can hollow out 
communities and dissolve families. But these are the resources—social bonds and 
economic livelihood—that tend to tip the potential offender’s personal calculus away 
from offending.193  
It might be argued that there are alternative policies we could embark on, other 
than rewards, that would trim or eliminate the advantages that rewards offer. For 
example, advocates have recommended safer prisons, or Scandinavian-model 
institutions with relatively few individuals per facility, as potential solutions to the 
criminogenesis problem.194 Advocates have not thus far found solutions to the 
American political unwillingness to spend money on these ideas.  
While I am not a political consultant, and so certainly cannot offer any strong 
claim that rewards would prove more politically viable than these (so-far) failed 
alternatives, I note that rewards may differ in a pair of key respects. Both are 
ultimately about budgets. First, hiring more prison guards or otherwise making 
prison safer would likely be an additional public expense, over and above current 
 
 
 188. Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 115, 117–18 (2008). 
 189. Cf. Amy E. Lerman, The People Prisons Make: Effects of Incarceration on Criminal 
Psychology, in DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 
151, 164–67 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009) (finding that high-security 
prisons increase violent attitudes among formerly nonviolent offenders). See generally James 
M. Byrne & Don Hummer, Myths and Realities of Prison Violence: A Review of the Evidence, 
2 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 77 (2008).  
 190. JOHN DEIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL 
MANAGEMENT 253 (1987). 
 191. Brendan D. Dooley, Alan Seals & David Skarbek, The Effects of Prison Gang 
Membership on Recidivism, 42 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 267, 268 (2014); Draca & Machin, supra note 
64, at 398–99; Megan Stevenson, Breaking Bad: Mechanisms of Social Influence and the Path 
to Criminality in Juvenile Jails, 99 REV. ECON. & STATS. 824, 825–37 (2017). 
 192. Patrick Bayer, Randi Hjalmarsson & David Pozen, Building Criminal Capital Behind 
Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections, 124 Q.J. ECON. 105, 125–37 (2009); Dooley, Seals 
& Skarbek, supra note 191, at 268–73; Stevenson, supra note 191, at 825–37. 
 193. Bocanegra, supra note 102, at 120; Fagan & Meares, supra note 42, at 182–212. 
 194. Mirko Bagaric, Dan Hunter & Gabrielle Wolf, Technological Incarceration and the 
End of the Prison Crisis, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 127–30 (2017). 
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costs.195 In contrast, rewards may well be budget neutral as compared to current 
policy, or even money saving: the key factor will be whether rewards achieve more 
or less crime prevention per dollar. We’ll continue to weigh that question over the 
remainder of the Article. 
The other difference is a technical one about the economics of deterrence, 
although it is a technical point that most people already have strong intuitions about. 
If we make prison safer, less torturous, less isolating, and so on, then a year of prison 
won’t be as psychologically debilitating. Arguably, that would reduce the deterrent 
effect of prison.196 To maintain current deterrence levels, the technical claim (and the 
popular intuition about it) might suggest that we would have to either impose longer 
sentences or detect and capture more offenders. Both of these would themselves be 
costly.197 In intuitive terms, we have to be tough on prisoners so that prison deters. I 
am skeptical about the premises of this claim; that is, for the reasons sketched in Part 
IV, below, I doubt that prison conditions meaningfully affect deterrence. But likely 
many voters believe to the contrary. 
Even if improving prison conditions does suffer from this problem, rewards need 
not. Again, the government can adjust its reward so that the combined income and 
substitution effects replicate the incentive effect of any prison sentence. Whether the 
required reward would cost more or less than the current cost of imprisonment is an 
empirical question. As I’ve just suggested, my prognostication is that rewards are 
quite competitive with prison on a cost basis.  
IV. EX ANTE INCENTIVES 
Another major advantage rewards may offer over incarceration is that they do not 
depend to nearly the same degree on human foresight. We saw in Part II evidence 
that extended terms of imprisonment provide little additional marginal deterrence, 
making them no more effective than shorter terms at preventing crime. That outcome 
is puzzling from a “rational choice” perspective: there is no question that three years 
in prison is quite a bit worse than two, even if only because of lost earnings. It makes 
a lot more sense, though, when considered together with the overwhelming evidence 
that humans are bad at thinking about and preparing for the future. Aesop knew it, 
and so do college students cramming for exams at the last minute. In this Section, I 
therefore consider how to design criminal law for short-sighted humans. 
 
 
 195. Maria Laura Alzúa, Catherine Rodriguez & Edgar Villa, The Quality of Life in 
Prisons, in THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME: LESSONS FOR AND FROM LATIN AMERICA 239, 240–41 
(Rafael Di Tella, Sebastian Edwards & Ernesto Schargrodsky eds., 2010). 
 196. See Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt & Ellen Shustorovich, Prison Conditions, 
Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 319 (2003) (reporting that 
a proxy for prison conditions is negatively correlated with crime rates). 
 197. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 117, at 417–18 (describing cost tradeoffs between 
prison and enforcement). 
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 A. Prison’s Ex Post Problem 
First, there is overwhelming evidence that many of us act as though we value the 
future far less than the present.198 Behavioral economists have a lot of fancy terms 
for that phenomenon: “hyperbolic discounting” and “present bias” and “time-
inconsistent preferences,” among others.199 While these vary in some of their 
technical details, they have similar implications: we are unwilling to give up a dollar 
today, even if it would give us much more than a dollar tomorrow.200 We don’t save 
enough for retirement.201 We fail to insure against future losses.202 We borrow more 
than we can pay back.203 We don’t go to the gym.204 Closest to home, lack of impulse 
control and discounting of future consequences predict a variety of criminal 
behaviors.205  
As other scholars have thoroughly explored, present bias deeply undermines the 
economic foundations of imprisonment.206 The whole concept of deterrence relies on 
 
 
 198. See, e.g., Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time 
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS 162, 172–78, 201–07 (Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin 
eds., 2004). 
 199. See id. (explaining terms, but not calling them “fancy”). 
 200. Some readers may be familiar with the phrase “time value of money.” This is a 
concept from project budgeting that measures the opportunity cost of money. In deciding 
whether to invest in any one project that pays off in the future, I should decide whether the 
project will pay off returns that would exceed what I could get if I invested in some other, 
safer, investment instead. For instance, I could put the money in government bonds. This safe 
payoff is the “time value” of my investment.  
We can use time value to compare present costs directly to future payoffs by turning it into 
a “discount rate.” A discount rate calculation determines how much money $Y I would have, 
given a present investment $X, if I invested in the safe option until period T. Again, I should 
only choose investments whose payoff in period T is larger than $X plus the safe investment. 
Calculating a “discounted present value” of $Y allows me to compare $X and $Y directly, and 
to choose the project if its payoff is larger than $Y. That is how a rational planner would 
prepare for the future. A “hyperbolic” discounter acts as though she has some extra payoff 
from current expenditures, so that $Y is discounted by more than would be implied by the safe 
investment return.  
 201. Brigitte C. Madrian, Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design, 
6 ANN. REV. ECON. 663, 668–69 (2014). 
 202. Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons from 
Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101, 106–08 (2006). 
 203. Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, supra note 198, at 201–07. 
 204. Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not To Go to the Gym, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 694, 695–96, 713–14 (2006); Jean-Denis Garon, Alix Masse & Pierre-Carl 
Michaud, Health Club Attendance, Expectations, and Self-Control, 199 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 364, 364–73 (2015). 
 205. Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Time and Punishment: Delayed Consequences and 
Criminal Behavior, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 295, passim (2004); see Geoffrey Fain 
Williams, Property Crime: Investigating Career Patterns and Earnings, 119 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 124, 125–26, 135 (2015). 
 206. See MARGERY FRY, ARMS OF THE LAW 83 (1951); Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, 
at 9; Robinson & Darley, supra note 36, at 194; Manuel Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and 
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the idea that an individual will anticipate the future consequences of her actions. If 
individuals are largely indifferent to those consequences, deterrence will do little to 
motivate them. Prison becomes mostly deadweight loss: pain we inflict, at great 
monetary cost, without any social benefit. To be sure, individuals might care about 
their future selves, but rather less than they care about their present. In that case, 
prison does deter but only in a highly cost-ineffective way so that it’s only mostly 
deadweight loss.  
Other commentators have also tentatively offered ways to tweak the prison system 
so that it is less vulnerable to present bias. One possibility that several authors have 
mentioned is to impose radically shorter sentences.207 Obviously, present-biased 
actors care much more about the jail time that is happening now or close to now than 
they do about the jail time that would happen ten years from now.208 Keeping 
sentences short helps to ensure that the punishments imposed occur at a time (close 
to now) that defendants care about. Of course, if one assumes that sentences imposed 
under present law provide the optimal amount of deterrence for rational actors, 
shortening sentences dramatically would increase crime. So these proposals 
generally also suggest increasing policing efforts to catch a larger share of offenders, 
thus maintaining something like the same expected punishment.209  
There is a lot to like about these ideas, but they face a daunting math problem.210 
Suppose we wanted to shorten sentences from their average two- to three-year terms 
for most offenses to about six months. If we are going to maintain the same expected 
punishment for an offense that currently carries an average thirty-month sentence, 
we will have to catch and convict five times as many offenders.211 Though a large 
share of offenders are convicted once caught,212 that level of enforcement still implies 
 
 
Repeated Time-Inconsistent Misconduct, 44 HOUSTON L. REV. 609, 657–62 (2007). 
 207. Nagin, supra note 29, at 100; see Miriam H. Baer, Evaluating the Consequences of 
Calibrated Sentencing: A Response to Professor Kolber, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 11, 15–
17 (2009).  
 208. See Utset, supra note 206, at 657–62. 
 209. Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, at 10. By “expected punishment,” I mean the 
average sentence times the probability of detection and conviction. Polinsky and Riskind 
attempt to turn present bias into an argument in favor of prison, by arguing that since prison 
occurs closer in time to an offense than parole, prison should be preferred to parole. A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Paul N. Riskind, Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and 
Probation, 62 J.L. & ECON. 347, 348–49 (2019). That may be so, but ex ante rewards or 
sentencing diversion efforts are even closer in time to the offense, making them more 
appealing still.  
 210. Cf. Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 29, at 41 (acknowledging questions about whether 
increased enforcement frequency is “scalable”).  
 211. This policy would also result in inefficient over-deterrence for unbiased individuals. 
See Galle, supra note 178, at 95. The optimal adjustment strategy would reduce sentence 
length only partially, and increase detection only moderately, to balance over- with under-
deterrence. See id. (describing approach to incentivizing when population varies in its 
awareness of incentive). But this approach would only mitigate, not eliminate, the waste of an 
ex post program. Id.  
 212. State conviction rates for felonies exceeds two-thirds on average. Brian A. Reaves, 
Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009 - Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 
(Dec. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM7D 
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a massive increase in policing and surveillance. Even if we were ready as a society 
to spend that kind of money, it is unlikely we would be happy with the consequences 
for our personal liberties.213  
B. Ex Ante Programs and the Targeting Problem 
One common alternative approach to addressing prison’s ex post problem is to try 
to address the factors that may contribute to present bias. Parole, probation, and other 
sentence-diversion programs commonly include drug treatment and other mental 
health services.214 It is likely that addiction and mental illness both sap our ability to 
make long-term plans.215 Treatment might therefore discourage recidivism by 
making former inmates more sensitive to threats of future punishment.  
Another notable feature of most mental health services linked to the criminal 
justice system is that they are only available post-conviction.216 That is perhaps a 
puzzle. If rewards are effective at preventing crime, why limit them to the group of 
individuals who have already been convicted? 
Cost is the simple answer, of course, but the more complicated rejoinder brings 
us back to some of the basic design principles of a regulatory regime. At a very high 
level of generality, most regulatory theorists prefer incentives whose value is 
determined after the regulated party has committed their good or bad acts—so-called 
ex post incentives.217 The rewards I’ve been considering, in contrast, are ex ante: the 
regulator offers them not to those who actually do wrong but instead to a much larger 
group of those who present risks of harm.218 The difficulty in ex ante incentives, and 
the reason other writers disfavor them, is that it’s hard to know who should belong 
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in the ex ante group and how big the ex ante incentive should be.219 Ex post we can 
observe not just who caused an injury but also how severe the injury was, allowing 
us to calibrate the punishment to the crime.220  
That is the defense most people would probably offer for why we limit mental 
health services mostly to post-conviction. Paying for, say, residential psychiatric care 
is very expensive.221 Clinical models may predict which individuals will present the 
biggest risk of crime if they don’t receive help, but these can never operate with 
certainty. If we just treated everyone with severe mental health needs, we could well 
spend billions without significantly reducing crime. In contrast, we might think that 
those who have already been convicted of one offense are unusually likely to commit 
another. Conviction thus arguably serves as a relatively cost-effective “targeting” or 
“screening” mechanism, helping us to allocate scarce mental health dollars to those 
where each dollar prevents the most crime.  
If that is the argument for why most preventive services now are available only 
post-conviction, it is not a very persuasive one. To the extent that we want to rely on 
arrest as a way to identify risk of subsequent offending, there is no need to interpose 
prison between the arrest and the preventive services. As we’ve seen, many 
prevention programs divert offenders away from the criminal justice system 
subsequent to arrest. 
It might be argued in response that using arrests to target benefits—without prison 
in between—creates undesirable incentives to be arrested. It’s not clear that this is 
true as a factual matter. Some diversion programs are coercive enough to carry their 
own deterrent effect.222 Further—just as some of us prefer not to save for retirement, 
but once we’re retired wish we had money—some individuals may not recognize 
treatment as valuable before they’ve received it; think here of the painful prospect of 
quitting a highly addictive drug.223 Even if the incentive point were true, using prison 
to “screen” for benefit delivery is enormously socially wasteful. In effect we are both 
paying for the benefit and also paying to make the benefit seem less appealing to 
potential beneficiaries.224 Costly screens work when those who most value the 
benefit don’t find the screening to be costly,225 but there is no reason to think that is 
the case for prison and preventive benefits.  
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In any event, we don’t need arrests to target benefits. To begin with, one simple 
step the government can do instead is offer rewards of several different values. As 
I’ve explained elsewhere, targeting is a problem of matching, and the costs of 
mismatching get larger exponentially with the size of the mismatch.226 With some 
computer-generated simulations, I’ve shown that even very roughly matching with 
three categories can capture most of the social gains that would be achieved through 
perfect matching.227 That is, if government has three categories of rewards—big, 
middle, and small—and can do a reasonably good job sorting those at risk of crime 
into the three categories, it can make matching vastly more cost-effective than with 
just a single category.228  
Technology and data science can make important contributions as well. To 
implement its sorting project, the government can draw on observable information 
and past results to generate predictions about which individuals are at highest risk. 
This is not science fiction. A robust literature has identified many of the individual 
and community risk factors for crime.229 Virginia has used algorithmic risk 
assessment in sentencing for more than two decades.230 More recent work by a team 
of economists on what they dub the “Opportunity Atlas” has been able to measure 
the likelihood that an individual will be incarcerated on a given date in the future at 
the block-by-block level.231 By studying relocated families, they show there is a 
strong likelihood this relationship is causal, i.e., that neighborhoods cause 
outcomes.232 But that distinction is not important for targeting of rewards programs: 
either way, residing on a block where forty-seven percent of black men will serve 
time can serve as a powerful indicator that an individual is a good investment for 
preventive spending.233  
To be sure, the problems of Big Data and algorithmic risk assessment are by now 
well known.234 Commentators complain rightly that algorithmic risk assessment can 
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compound  societal  racism  and  classism,  offering  projections  of  who  should  be 
detained that would tend to most heavily burden communities of color.235  
Remarkably, by using algorithmic risk assessment to assign rewards instead of 
punishments, we make the algorithm’s own biases a potential source of corrective 
social justice. That is, let’s take it as given that algorithms tend to overpredict crime 
risk for African Americans. In my proposal, these same algorithms would be used to 
determine who gets the largest rewards. So biased algorithms would tend to 
systematically favor granting rewards to minority communities. But admittedly not 
all rewards programs can be targeted by an algorithm. Others, such as “street 
diversion” by police officers, still pose the risk that they will reflect human biases 
and emotions.236  
Mistargeting is still a concern when granting rewards—rewards cost money, 
which requires socially costly tax revenue—but it is a much smaller concern when 
the result is to over-reward the poorest and the socially neglected. David Super has 
explained a similar dynamic with the allocation of social safety-net spending. As 
Super notes, even if we mistarget awards a little bit, we are still giving money to 
those who need it much more desperately than the average household.237  
Mistargeting can also be economically efficient to the extent that it “smoothes” 
what would otherwise have been a sharp legal distinction between those eligible for 
benefits and those who are not. Some programs phase out their benefits slowly, so 
that there is not much difference between those who just qualify and those who just 
miss qualifying.238 But others have dramatic differences in benefits tied to small 
practical differences. A household whose child turns seventeen on December 31 gets 
a child tax credit of several thousand dollars; another whose child turns seventeen on 
January 2 gets nothing.239 These differences are inequitable, and often they produce 
strong and unwanted behavioral distortions (in an era where delivery can be induced, 
more children are born December 31 than January 2).240 Many criminal justice 
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rewards will probably be hard to phase out: either an individual gets residential 
mental health treatment, or they don’t.241 Mistargeting blurs the resulting sharp 
boundaries, diminishing the difference between those who would qualify under a 
perfectly administered system and those who wouldn’t.242  
C. Behaviorally Informed Ex Ante Policy 
Whether or not we see targeting as a serious obstacle for ex ante crime prevention, 
there are some important theoretical advantages to ex ante policy making. Some of 
these derive from the fact that up-front awards allows potential offenders to exchange 
a large, risky outcome (committing a crime, being detected and convicted) for a 
small, relatively certain one (being paid to refrain from situations that increase risk 
of crime). Other benefits build on what behavioral economics has taught us about 
how to design incentives.  
Let’s start with the benefits of swapping big risks for small certainties. 
Economists recognize that prison is an inefficient way to incentivize humans because 
it forces people to bear risks.243 Humans are typically “risk averse”: the welfare or 
“utility” gains from winning a 50/50 bet are not as big as the costs of losing.244 If 
your bank account stands at $50,000, do you want to place a $49,999 bet with even 
odds? The criminal justice system forces many people to play just this kind of 
undesirable lottery. Reporting and “clearance” rates for most crimes are low, and to 
account for this we make the resulting penalty much higher than it would need to be 
in an environment where detection and conviction was more likely.245 Because it 
imposes risk, the total suffering this system inflicts is much larger than one with 
identical total punishments but where all the punishments were small and certain.246 
Lowering the stakes each individual faces also efficiently reduces the variance of 
the government’s incentive. Murat Mungan and I have shown that regulatory systems 
(including the criminal justice system, of course) go wrong when government can’t 
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predict perfectly how much suffering (or benefit) its punishments (or rewards, 
respectively) will cause any given individual.247 Even if the regulator knows on 
average how much deterrence a year in prison offers, some defendants will 
subjectively be deterred more or less. This means that a one-year sentence will over-
deter some defendants while under-deterring others. As we’ve explained, smaller and 
more frequent incentives reduce this problem.248 The smaller the incentive, the less 
of a difference there is between those who value it more than average and those who 
value it less. And, once more, the social cost of errors grows exponentially with the 
size of the government’s mistake.  
Ex ante incentives probably also reduce variance in a potential offender’s 
subjective valuation just by being easier to understand. Even if there were no 
“hyperbolic discounting,” some people would likely mistake the risks of future 
imprisonment because they don’t know its real likelihood and have never 
experienced it.249 These problems are greatly minimized if instead we use an 
incentive most people understand—money, say—and offer it with certainty to 
everyone who qualifies.250  
Let’s now also glance at some design lessons behavioral economics offers for 
regulating in the face of present bias. By definition, the present-biased actor much 
prefers immediate incentives to those that come later. This might look like a 
disadvantage for rewards. The absence of crime isn’t something that happens just 
once: the individual has to make it happen every day. Regulators don’t necessarily 
have to pay rewards every day; we could offer a large payment in the future instead—
for instance, adding bonus Social Security payments to those without any felony 
convictions. But, of course, these long-run incentives won’t likely be very motivating 
for individuals who are present biased.  
Commitment devices are now a standard solution to this problem.251 The 
commitment device is like regulatory martial arts: it uses the individual’s bias to help 
overcome that bias.252 Default retirement savings are the classic example.253 We 
think many people don’t save for retirement because they find the present annoyance 
of filling out the paperwork to be more important than having money years later. To 
the extent defaults work, they likely do so because the people who find paperwork 
annoying are the same people who won’t be bothered to opt out of the default.254 So 
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defaults increase retirement savings.255 
The analogous policy in the crime prevention context is probably to pay 
individuals now to enter into programs that they will find costly to leave. Residential 
treatment in remote locations offers the most obvious example, but there are many 
ways to make exit costly other than a pricey cab ride back from the countryside. Drug 
and alcohol cessation programs often strive to create strong in-group bonds for 
participants so that social bonds and peer pressure encourage continuing 
participation.256 Similarly, successful programs often enlist friends and family to help 
with their efforts, adding another layer of social pressure to stick with it (and 
potentially removing stressors from those sources that might encourage drug use).257 
A hyperrational person who otherwise is unwilling to join such a program would not 
be willing to accept a small present payment to do so, knowing that she will find 
quitting later socially painful.258 But by definition, the present-biased actor doesn’t 
fully account for future consequences; she takes the reward and worries about the 
downsides later.  
V. THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IS OVERSTATED 
So far we’ve seen an array of economic arguments in favor of rewards over 
imprisonment. Stacked up on the other side are two long-standing arguments against 
rewards: moral hazard and cost-effectiveness. Past commentators are correct that 
both these factors should be central in our decision about how to prevent crime. But 
neither argument is nearly as potent as others have assumed. This Part addresses 
moral hazard, and then the next will take on cost.  
What is “moral hazard”? Many readers will be familiar with the basic concept of 
moral hazard in the context of insurance.259 Consider that private insurance does not 
typically cover intentional acts, and for good reason.260 If I could get a big insurance 
payout by clobbering my neighbor, many backyard disputes could quickly turn 
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ugly.261 So, too, I shouldn’t expect to collect on my auto insurance policy if I failed 
to fix my shrieking brakes. This is the moral hazard problem: insurance can increase 
harms since the insured has diminished incentives to avoid causing or suffering 
injury.262  
The moral hazard concern has historically been one of the most powerful 
arguments against rewards in a criminal setting.263 Theorists of regulation sometimes 
call this same idea the “polluter pays” principle: people or entities who threaten harm 
to the public shouldn’t expect to be reimbursed fully for their efforts.264 Instead, they 
should bear costs, so that they have incentives to mitigate that harm.265 And this is 
socially efficient, among other reasons, because the people or entities who threaten 
harm typically are in the best position to know about and control the level of damage 
that they do.266  
What is puzzling about these accounts is that, while they draw on moral hazard 
arguments familiar to private insurance law, they fail to also adopt the standard 
solution insurance law offers. In most cases, insurers do not refuse to insure parties 
who might be in a position to increase the insurer’s costs. Instead, the insurer charges 
a co-pay or imposes a deductible.267 You have to kick in some of the cost of your 
dental visits because your insurer believes that otherwise you wouldn’t floss. That is, 
the insured must still bear some of the cost of risks that she could potentially prevent 
or mitigate so that she has a reason to take precautions. Co-pays can often be small, 
relative to the total cost of the injury, because the insured is very risk averse 
compared to the insurer: a small co-pay is enough to encourage her to take a fair 
amount of precaution.268  
We can translate this insight to public law by looking to the work of Gerrit De 
Geest and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (who, to extend the life of my keyboard, are 
hereinafter “DGDM”). DGDM argue that societies should often prefer rewards, or 
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“carrots,” over penalties, or “sticks,” because carrots reduce deadweight loss.269 In 
their model, carrots are funded with tax dollars so that the burden of paying for them 
rests with society at large.270 Penalties, in contrast, flow in the other direction, 
harming a few for the benefit of the many.271 The same is largely true if individuals 
comply rather than be punished; assuming that compliance is costly and that 
compliers are not reimbursed, it is they who shoulder the burden of avoiding social 
harms.272 By sharing the burden, the total social cost of the burden is lessened.  
Why would that be? The intuition behind the model is a familiar one to tax 
scholars, or torts experts versed in the work of Guido Calabresi. At its most basic, 
the idea is simply that social costs should be shared widely, rather than concentrated 
on a few people, because of diminishing marginal utility.273 As we saw already, 
diminishing marginal utility means that dollars have greater value when we have less 
of them. Thus, taking a few dollars from everyone is far better than taking an equal 
sum from one person, assuming all are equally well-off to begin with. With cost 
spreading, everyone gives up a latte, while with concentrated costs, one person is left 
destitute. Calabresi argued that this was the genius of accident insurance: it socialized 
the costs of driving instead of leaving them to fall on the unlucky drivers who 
crash.274  
The move that DGDM make (following HLA Hart) 275 is to translate this 
framework to crime. In essence, they conceive of everyone as a potential criminal 
defendant, each of us with a risk of being thrown into circumstances where we might 
come up against the law. Carrots offer a kind of insurance: they lead us away from 
law breaking, but the cost of avoiding harm is shared by all those whom the law 
protects.276 
DGDM omit moral hazard from their account, but in recent work with John 
Brooks and Brendan Maher, I showed how that factor can easily be incorporated into 
the DGDM analysis.277 We argue for adopting insurance solutions to public law 
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situations that mimic insurance.278 Again, an optimally designed insurance contract 
balances the benefits of risk spreading against the costs of moral hazard.279 Thus, 
societies should often want to offer a mix of carrots—which, like insurance, spread 
costs—and sticks, which serve to target costs on those who must comply.280  
Put another way, DGDM’s risk-spreading argument could be taken as an 
argument not necessarily for prison abolition but for prison reduction. The optimal 
risk allocation for preventing social harms should make the cost of noncompliance 
painful enough that polluters have incentives to mitigate or robbers incentives to find 
another line of work. But it should also be balanced so that not all this pain falls only 
on those individuals unlucky enough to have to decide whether to rob or to eat. 
Government policy should combine rewards with small or occasional fines or 
imprisonment.  
But if the solution to moral hazard is as simple as co-pays, a skeptic might argue, 
why don’t private insurers typically cover intentional acts? One possible answer is 
that the private insurer cannot impose a prison sentence.281 In other words, the 
optimal insurance contract for intentional acts likely requires the insured to bear more 
risk than she can realistically afford, and the insurer has no way to impose costs on 
the insured other than by asking her to pay.282  
Adverse selection provides another possible explanation for why intentional acts 
go uninsured. In a world with competing insurers, prices and terms for insurance 
contracts will vary. Those seeking insurance usually know the likelihood that they 
will commit an intentional act better than the insurer can.283 So those who don’t 
expect to need insurance won’t pay much for it. If insurers charge a lot for 
premiums—say, because they can’t impose the optimal co-pay—then only those at 
greatest risk of needing insurance will buy.284 That doesn’t work; the insurer can’t 
pay out more than it takes in.285  
These problems with private insurance are not arguments against rewards because 
governments face neither of these limitations. The government sets the “insurance 
contract” available to each person, not vice versa, so that potentially there is no 
adverse selection. That is the central argument for mandatory insurance models, such 
as the Affordable Care Act, as well as for “single-payer” systems like Britain’s 
National Health Service.286 And the government’s tools for limiting moral hazard are 
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not limited to co-pays. The government can institute whatever mix of rewards and 
prison or other penalties that optimally balances risk spreading with moral hazard 
reduction. 
Good targeting can also mitigate moral hazard, allowing a larger fraction of 
incentives to be rewards rather than punishments. In standard insurance models, the 
optimal division of payments between insurer and insured depends on the “elasticity” 
of the insured’s response to insurance: how much does a person change their behavior 
when someone else is paying?287 If people can and do readily change their behavior, 
they usually must face higher co-pays.  
Translating this principle to prisons, the lesson is that eligibility for rewards 
should be based on definitions of “risk” or other eligibility criteria that are hard or 
very undesirable for potential recipients to adopt. Location again might be a plausible 
example. Within each urban area, a surprisingly large fraction of crimes originate 
with individuals from a tiny handful of blocks.288 Residence on these blocks could 
be used as a major input into the calculation of whether positive incentives are 
available. Of course, there then would be an incentive to move to or remain in these 
neighborhoods, but most are so undesirable that the government’s reward would be 
highly unlikely to change many decisions about where to live.289 Another option 
would be to deliver rewards in a form, such as a housing vouchers, that encourages 
relocation away from the targeted area. This might be especially useful if living in 
the highest-risk places is not just predictive but actually causal, as suggested by the 
literature I reviewed in Part I.290  
If we thought moral hazard was a serious concern, it would offer another argument 
against limiting prevention programs to during or after prison. Post-conviction 
rewards might reduce recidivism, but if they have any subjective value for potential 
offenders, they presumably also increase the likelihood of an initial crime.291 An 
initial sentence of incarceration, as we have seen, in turn increases the likelihood of 
additional wrongdoing. So it is possible that post-conviction rewards actually 
 
 
death spirals, thereby mitigating some of the costs of adverse selection. This approach faces 
serious measurement and political economy challenges. Id. at 624–25. 
 287. See Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 259, at 578–79. 
 288. See Bocanegra, supra note 102, at 116; Meares, Katyal & Kahan, supra note 69, at 
1191 (summarizing studies). 
 289. Real-world experiments with housing vouchers find that many voucher recipients do 
not move but that this inertia is mostly due to administrative obstacles; when recipients have 
the assistance of a housing administration official, they change neighborhoods at very high 
rates. Peter Bergman, Raj Chetty, Stefanie DeLuca, Nathaniel Hendren, Lawrence F. Katz & 
Christopher Palmer, Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers to 
Neighborhood Choice, 30–36 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26164, 2019). 
Another explanation consistent with this evidence is that discrimination against voucher 
holders limits their mobility; it is of course much harder for landlords to discriminate when 
they must interact directly with a government employee. Cf. id. at 33–34 (reporting that tenants 
found role of housing officials in “brokering” apartment availability a helpful factor in 
relocating). 
 290. See supra notes 63–68. 
 291. Readers of a certain age may recall that in fact this is the central plotline of an O. 
Henry story, “The Cop and the Anthem.”  
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increase crime, on net. At a minimum, requiring conviction as a condition of 
dispensing rewards looks to be an ineffective way of saving money.  
VI. COST EFFECTIVENESS: THE BOTTOM LINE 
Besides moral hazard, the economic literature offers a second well-known 
argument against rewards: they’re expensive.292 Deterrence is relatively cheap 
because individuals who are in fact deterred do not need to be incarcerated, creating 
a kind of multiplier effect. In contrast, if government is going to reward us for good 
behavior, and if everyone is good, then government must pay everyone. Expenditures 
on any program add up very quickly when they are multiplied by three hundred 
million members of the population. Many of these individuals would have complied 
even without payment, making the payments largely wasted resources.  
Although this point is correct in the abstract, it turns out to have fairly limited 
implications for crime prevention rewards policies. In this Part I will offer a back-of-
the-envelope calculation for whether rewards policies are affordable. The bottom-
line question, I suggest, is whether there is a viable path to a revenue-neutral and 
crime-neutral shift from prison spending to rewards. In other words, could we cut the 
prison budget and move that money to rewards, without also increasing crime? Since 
this is not a Hitchcock film, I will spoil the suspense: the answer is almost certainly 
yes.  
The more challenging question is to estimate how extensive this exchange should 
be. There is little doubt we can productively trim the longest sentences, particularly 
for those classes of offenses where the propensity to recidivate is markedly lower 
among older individuals. As we continue reducing, though, at some point we get into 
the range where evidence suggests an additional term of imprisonment does have 
meaningful effects on crime so that it becomes important to know how productive an 
additional dollar spent on rewards would be.293 Prison is said to reduce crime not 
only through deterrence but also through “incapacitation,” or the fact that 
incarcerated individuals do not have the opportunity to commit some crimes, such as 
burglary. 294 I’ll discuss the relative cost-effectiveness of rewards as against each of 
these in turn. 
Of course, deciding whether something is cost effective requires us to first specify 
what it is we’re trying to accomplish. One yardstick might simply be which policy 
can prevent crime at the lowest cost. Then our question would be: Can we reduce 
sentences and increase rewards without also increasing crime? As we’ve seen, 
though, there are massive potential social welfare differences between rewards and 
prison, even holding the amount of crime constant—rewards eliminate many forms 
of deadweight loss and negative externalities and can in turn create some positive 
externalities. The best measure of cost-effectiveness would thus be to compare the 
total social welfare effect of an incremental dollar spent on rewards or prisons.295 But 
 
 
 292. See sources cited supra note 26.  
 293. PFAFF, supra note 16, at 115. 
 294. TRAVIS, WESTERN & REDBURN, supra note 1, at 131. 
 295. For one effort in this direction, see Mungan, supra note 117, at 17–22. Mungan 
attempts to estimate how efficient at raising money the U.S. tax system would have to be in 
order for rewards to be part of the optimal set of crime reduction incentives. Id. at 20–22. He 
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subjective well-being is hard to measure. In the comparisons to follow, I will 
therefore focus only on the relative costs of reducing crime, but the reader should 
understand that this framing is stacking the deck against rewards.  
A. Rewards Versus Deterrence 
There is no single answer to whether preventive rewards reduce crime more or 
less cost-effectively than deterrence. There are a wide variety of prevention 
programs, of course. As I reviewed in Part I, substantial empirical evidence suggests 
these programs reduce crime, though there are few studies that put these findings 
together with cost data to estimate crime prevention per dollar. I will instead 
emphasize the cost efficacy of prison. Crucially, there are diminishing returns to 
incarceration. The threat of a second year of prison deters less than the threat of the 
first year, and so on. This implies that, while short sentences might be more effective 
than rewards, longer sentences might be less effective.  
Evidence also suggests that if rewards prevent any crime at all they are more 
effective per dollar than a large fraction of current prison expenditures. As we have 
already seen, the marginal deterrence of sentences longer than about five years is 
close to zero.296 What if we simply took all the money now spent on these longer 
sentences and devoted it to rewards instead? Would this result in enough money to 
plausibly support nationwide prevention programs of any significant size?  
To offer a back-of-the-envelope answer, I downloaded prison population data 
from the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) for the period 2000 
through 2014. NCRP is a survey of state prison populations for forty-three states, 
collected by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. NCRP reports, for each state and 
year, the number of individuals currently incarcerated. This figure is further broken 
down by the length of sentence currently being served by each individual, although 
sentences of more than five years are only reported in five-year bands, such as five 
to ten years or ten to fifteen years.  
I implement a simulation in which all individuals sentenced to serve terms of more 
than five years were instead released at the end of their fifth year. I then calculate the 
change in expected prison population as a result of this policy.297 In 2013, the last 
 
 
includes the welfare effects of using rewards instead of penalties but assumes that the elasticity 
of crime with respect to prison is uniform. See id. In contrast, I omit welfare effects but assume 
that the crime elasticity of prison varies by sentence length.  
 296. And, to repeat, this finding was in a unique Italian setting that likely overestimates 
the usual deterrent effect of U.S. prison sentences. See supra note 42. 
 297. All else equal, I assume that the odds an individual observed in a given year has served 
no more than five years to be five over the total expected years of their sentence. For example, 
the odds that a person serving a ten-year sentence has served five years or fewer, in any 
randomly drawn year during their sentence, is fifty-fifty. Thus for each year band, I estimate 
the share of individuals who on average have served five or fewer years by taking the ratio of 
five to the midpoint of the year band. I then multiply this share by the population in that band 
and use this as the total number of individuals in that band who would be released. For 
instance, Alabama in 2014 reported 5244 individuals serving sentences of five to ten years. I 
calculated that 5/7.5, or 66.67%, of these individuals would on average have served five years 
or fewer. Thus, I infer that 33.33% of these individuals would be eligible for release under my 
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year for which I have complete data on all forty-three surveyed states, this comes to 
just about 180,000 individuals, out of an overall prison population in these states of 
approximately 1.5 million. That’s 12% of the total population.298  
Now let’s put that in dollars. Many of the costs of prison are fixed, such as 
facilities maintenance and civil-service salaries.299 The marginal cost of housing one 
additional individual (assuming no one is hired or fired and no additional buildings 
are closed or built) has been estimated around $18 to $20 thousand.300 If we use that 
figure, our savings would be about $3.4 billion.  
But although marginal cost savings are a reasonable way to think about the dollars 
involved in small, short-term changes in prison population,301 we are instead 
examining a large and permanent policy. If prison populations really fell by 12% in 
perpetuity, buildings would close and guard positions would be eliminated. What if 
we instead drew on the estimate, also from around 2013, that direct nationwide costs 
of imprisonment ran about $80 billion?302 Twelve percent of that is $9.6 billion. And 
this is a conservative estimate, since it omits some associated costs of the criminal 
justice system, such as health care and lawyers. Those are usually thought to add 
another $120 billion or so.  
Let’s call our national rewards budget $10 billion annually. That sounds like a lot, 
but there were also a lot of crimes nationally. Recent FBI figures estimate that there 
were about two million thefts of property worth more than $200, one million 
burglaries, 800,000 aggravated assaults, and around 300,000 other serious violent 
offenses (including robberies).303 That would give us only about $2500 per crime for 
prevention, ignoring drug offenses. Still, this figure is close to the annual value of 
the Alaska dividend, which, as we have seen, seems to have considerably reduced 
property crimes.304 So just blindly flinging the money spent on long prison sentences 
 
 
simulated policy. This resulted in a projected total of 1748 individuals released.  
 298. Again, this is only state prisons, not jails or federal detention facilities. Including 
federal figures in the calculations in the main text would bring the result up to a 15% release 
rate. 
Where does this 15% estimate come from? According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
there were 158,381 individuals serving sentences in federal facilities as of the beginning of 
2020. Sentences Imposed, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (last visited Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_sentences.jsp [https://perma.cc/H5BR 
-2KUU]. Of these, there were 41,909 in the 5 to 10-year band, 34,846 serving 10–15 years, 
18,714 serving 15–20, 22,859 serving more than 20, and 4525 with life sentences. Using the 
same calculation methods as for state prisons, these data would imply that 13,830 + 20,907 + 
13,367 + 17,779 + 3702 = 69,585 federal prisoners have currently served more than five years. 
 299. Pfaff, supra note 4, at 957. 
 300. PFAFF, supra note 16, at 99.  
 301. See id. at 99–100. 
 302. Id. at 101. 
 303. Table 23: Offense Analysis: Number and Percent Change, 2017–2018, FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION: UNIF. CRIME REPORTING, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime 
-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table-23 [https://perma.cc/Z84T-ZXVJ]; Crime in the United States, 
2018: Aggravated Assault, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: UNIF. CRIME REPORTING, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/aggravated 
-assault [https://perma.cc/HTJ5-4796]. 
 304. Dorsett, supra note 25, at 31–32, 49 fig.1. 
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in the general direction of likely offenders would prevent more crime than the 
deterrent effects of those sentences.  
More sensibly, rather than trying to spend our money equally to prevent every 
crime, we would take this $10 billion and target it using the systems and technologies 
I’ve described. Ten billion would go a lot further if it were aimed at the relatively 
small number of U.S. neighborhoods where crime is most concentrated. It also would 
deliver higher impact if allocated by on-the-ground experts with training and access 
to risk information, as in the community policing and community courts models we 
encountered in Part I. In these kinds of settings, the few cost-effectiveness data we 
have suggest prevention is highly impactful. One California study concluded, for 
instance, that drug courts on average saved between $6 and $8 thousand per 
individual in avoided prison costs, even after accounting for the costs of the court 
and the treatment.305  
 B. Rewards Versus Incapacitation 
In addition to deterrence, prison also prevents crime by “incapacitation,” or just 
keeping individuals away from the opportunity to offend. By my rough calculations, 
derived from econometric studies, incapacitation may account for as much as three-
quarters of all the crime reduction that prison accomplishes.306 In other words, 
despite the likely criminogenic effects of incarceration, jailing some individuals does 
appear to prevent crime on net.307 So even if sentences of, say, more than five years 
do not deter, they may still reduce crime via incapacitation. Would this incapacitation 
be more or less cost-effective than prevention? 
 
 
 305. See Fan, supra note 111, at 180, for a helpful overview of this and related studies.  
 306. Where does this three-quarters estimate come from? Levitt reports an overall elasticity 
of crime with respect to prison time of about 0.4. Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison 
Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q.J. 
ECON. 319, 337–39 (1996). This estimate combines deterrence and incapacitation effects. Id. 
at 346. Other studies, as we have seen, report elasticities of the deterrent effect of crime at 
around 0.1 or less. That implies that most of the impact Levitt observes is due to incapacitation.  
It must also be said that Levitt relies on an “instrumental variable” technique. Id. at 337. A 
classic malfunction of instrumental approaches is to inflate the measured coefficient, 
particularly when the “instrument” causally affects the outcome of interest. Joshua D. Angrist, 
Guido W. Imbens & Donald B. Rubin, Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental 
Variables, 91 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 444 § 4.2 (1996); see JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN 
PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS 153 (paperback ed. 2009). This seems very 
likely. The existence of overcrowding and associated litigation both may tend to affect 
policing and charging decisions in ways that potential offenders can observe (or predict), 
which in turn would affect deterrence. Levitt relies on “overidentifying” tests to rule out this 
problem, Levitt, supra note 306, at 323, but these tests have since been shown to be unreliable. 
ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra, at 205–13. His only other argument is that crime rates do not 
predict overcrowding litigation, Levitt, supra note 306, at 323, but this in no way addresses 
the policing and charging possibility.  
 307. For some crimes, however, incapacitation may be totally ineffective. Drug offenses 
are a likely example. Removing some potential dealers, without changing drug demand, would 
likely induce new competitors to enter the supplier market. Alternately, it might allow existing 
suppliers to increase supply, or, if they have market power, prices.  
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Unlike deterrence, incapacitation has no structural cost advantage over 
prevention. In theory, it is possible to deter offenders without paying to imprison 
them. But incapacitation requires us to pay every day for every potential offender we 
wish to refrain from crime. 308 Some forms of prevention are like this—a conditional 
payment that delivers rewards to nonoffenders requires a continuing stream of 
payments.309 Others, though, more closely resemble deterrence, in the sense that a 
one-time payment, such as for drug treatment, may reduce the treated individual’s 
propensity to offend for a long time afterwards.  
For prevention efforts that require continual payouts, relative cost advantage 
comes down to two factors. One, of course, is the daily cost of the program. As we’ve 
seen, the marginal cost of incarcerating one person is likely around $20 thousand per 
year, excluding health and non-prison administrative costs. Many prevention 
programs will be competitive at that price point.310 Again, it is very likely that 
incarceration imposes large social costs that are not captured on legislators’ budgets, 
but for the sake of argument I am omitting these difficult-to-measure factors.  
If we limit ourselves solely to the most measurable output, crime, and measurable 
input, budget dollars, the crucial determinant between incarceration and prevention 
is targeting. Both prevention and incapacitation costs are wasted if they are spent on 
someone who would not have committed crime.  
Targeting cannot justify current U.S. practices. On average, only about one in 
three incarcerated U.S. individuals reoffend.311 Older individuals reoffend at 
dramatically lower rates.312 While this “age-crime curve” varies by offense category, 
individuals age out of the propensity to engage in crime very rapidly for most 
nondrug offenses.313 This suggests that most of the money we now spend attempting 
to achieve incapacitation is wasted. We could easily reduce prison spending by 
billions without much impact on crime rates.  
In theory, we could use the targeting methods I’ve already described for 
incapacitation too. Suppose it were the case that our targeting methods perfectly 
identified high-risk individuals. What if prevention methods only prevent crime for 
one in four participants, while incapacitation prevents (non-prison) crime with 100% 
effectiveness (albeit with some criminogenic side effects)? Since existing data 
mostly examine returns to prevention programs that were only modestly targeted, we 
 
 
 308. Caulkins & Kleiman, supra note 54, at 305. 
 309. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text; see also Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 54 
(noting that rehabilitation has no deterrent effect).  
 310. For a useful overview of studies of prevention program cost efficacy, see Fan, supra 
note 111, at 179–80. 
 311. William Rhodes, Gerald Gaes, Jeremy Luallen, Ryan Kling, Tom Rich & Michael 
Shively, Following Incarceration, Most Released Offenders Never Return to Prison, 62 CRIME 
& DELINQ. 1003, 1013–15 (2016) (reporting rate of re-offense within twelve years of original 
offense). 
 312. PFAFF, supra note 16, at 191. 
 313. Ghandnoosh, supra note 55, at 145–46; see Fain Williams, supra note 205, at 131–
32. For more discussion of life-cycle changes in propensity to commit crime, see M. Eve 
Hanan, Incapacitating Errors: Sentencing and the Science of Change, 97 DENV. L. REV. 151, 
180–86 (2019).  
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don’t have good evidence on this dimension of cost efficacy.314  
Even if that were so, prevention would still offer major benefits. For one, by 
definition, incapacitation only reaches individuals who have already committed at 
least one offense.315 It leaves untouched a large pool of potentially risky individuals: 
those who have not yet been arrested for a crime. Any targeted program will involve 
diminishing returns. We treat the highest-risk individuals first, so that as we reach 
more and more, we are decreasingly likely to be spending money effectively.316 
Researchers find that the United States is extremely far down this diminishing returns 
curve for incapacitation, with U.S. sentences on average preventing only about one-
sixth the number of crimes as nations that jail fewer individuals.317 This suggests that 
shifting preventative efforts over to a population that has not been targeted at all by 
incapacitative sentencing—the unarrested—should offer vastly higher marginal 
returns.318  
Another point in prevention’s favor is that many major prevention efforts also 
incapacitate. We don’t have to lock people up in order to remove them from settings 
where they can easily engage in crime. Schools “incapacitate” in this sense. 319 So do 
jobs and families.320 If we can achieve incapacitation through methods that do not 
destroy human capital and do not bleed families and communities, these approaches 
almost certainly offer a higher social return per dollar, even if measured only by the 
 
 
 314. One survey reported that prison and post-release treatment programs were about four 
times as effective in preventing additional crimes as incarceration, but it does not include cost 
information. Taxman & Murphy, supra note 59, at 193–94. We do know that policing 
expenditures are far more cost-effective than imprisonment costs. PFAFF, supra note 16, at 
117. Could we use “community policing” to identify candidates for preventive services? 
Perhaps, but again we are at the limits of our data. Findings of police efficacy are generally in 
settings where policing leads to imprisonment; we do not know whether returns would be as 
high in a nonpunitive setting.  
 315. Nothing in economic theory rules out incapacitation for nonoffenders. But such 
approaches are probably unconstitutional in the United States if applied outside certain very 
narrow classes of extremely dangerous individuals. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409–13 
(2003). And they offend our sense of justice. If justice does not permit incapacitative detention 
for large segments of the population, how can it permit incapacitation for young men of color 
at far higher rates than older white women? 
 316. See Rhodes, Gaes, Luallen, Kling, Rich & Shively, supra note 311, at 1020–21 
(noting that recidivism is highly concentrated, so that a large share of prison beds are occupied 
by a small share of total population of offenders). 
 317. See Nagin, supra note 29, at 84. Older estimates of marginal returns to incapacitation 
are thus much larger than modern estimates when many more people are in prison. Paolo 
Buonanno & Steven Raphael, Incarceration and Incapacitation: Evidence from the 2006 
Italian Collective Pardon, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2437, 2439 (2013). Studies of the 
contemporary United States suggest that one prison year of incapacitation prevents two to four 
crimes. Id. The researchers’ estimate for 2006 Italy is fourteen to eighteen crimes per prison 
year. Id. at 2451–52. They note the Italian incarceration rate is vastly lower than the United 
States, id. at 2460, and that incapacitation’s marginal efficacy drops quickly, so they agree 
with U.S. estimates. 
 318. I explain the mathematical basis for this point in Brian Galle, The Problem of Intra-
Personal Cost, 18 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 49–50 (2018). 
 319. Draca & Machin, supra note 64, at 397. 
 320. ROCQUE, supra note 15, at 100–01, 154–56. 
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most salient of inputs and outputs. After all, working individuals usually pay taxes, 
and working parents contribute to household income, reducing the government 
outlay of social services.321 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, the arguments that U.S. efforts at crime prevention should involve 
vastly more positive incentives are overwhelming. At current levels of incarceration, 
we are getting very little marginal return on prison spending—if cuts were made with 
any care at all, we could save billions without increasing crime. At the same time, 
the marginal returns to new spending on positive incentives look to be very large, 
especially if carefully targeted. 
Thus, for example, evidence powerfully suggests that an intensive program of 
benefits aimed at neighborhoods of deep poverty and rampant crime would be 
extremely effective both at reducing crime and increasing social justice. As we have 
seen, rewards targeted in this fashion would lift up blighted communities, as opposed 
to mass incarceration’s tendency to drive them further into a cycle of poverty and 
lawlessness. It is extremely unlikely, given the current unattractiveness of many of 
these areas, that geographically targeted incentives would draw in new residents 
interested only in the benefits. Even if they did, these new residents would likely 
themselves already live quite close to the most blighted areas, and themselves be 
quite poor. Delivering benefits primarily in the form of drug treatment and housing 
mobility assistance would further lessen any “moral hazard.” 
As I said at the outset, I have no particular insight into how to make politically 
popular the message that society should make large-scale, new commitments to poor 
communities, many of them communities of color. The goal here is only to remove 
one possible source of self-justification that opponents of such spending may have 
clung to: the notion that such communities are to blame for their own failures and 
that efforts to aid them in their struggle for security would only worsen the problem. 
We’ve seen that the opposite is true, that draconian policing and incarceration 
policies likely worsen the circumstances people in crime-stricken communities face, 
and therefore, that positive incentives offer a far more promising path forward.  
While I have less to say about whether positive incentives make sense as a 
universal replacement for incarceration, my analysis suggests that crime reduction 
might be an important side effect of a universal basic income or other broad safety-
net programs. I cannot say on the strength of my evidence here that we should abolish 
prisons (although I also cannot say we shouldn’t). At some point, as we expand 
positive incentives and reduce incarceration, the marginal returns of the two may 
equalize; for potential offenders who are very hard to discourage from crime, for 
instance, incapacitation may be more cost effective. Still, past claims that cash 
payouts are ineffective at reducing crime have been dramatically misinterpreted, 
and new evidence is suggesting unconditional cash might be more 
effective at discouraging crime even than conditional payouts. That surely should 
count in any cost-benefit analysis of safety-net or UBI spending.  
321. See Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev & Yavitz, supra note 83, at 120–22 (estimating
social benefit of education on reduced crime, and in turn on higher wages and reduced 
demands on social services).  
